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Contingent Capital in European Union 
Bank Restructuring 
Christoph K. Henkel* and Wulf A. Kaal** 
Abstract: The uncoordinated reorganization and resolution of Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions in different countries pose many challenges. 
Contingent capital provides a viable alternative for the efficient restructuring 
and resolution of failing financial institutions.  Contingent Capital provides a 
mechanism for internalizing banks’ failure costs and helps return distressed 
financial institutions to solvency.  This article offers a comparative perspective 
on bank resolution and restructuring in the European Union, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and Germany and shows that Contingent Capital could play a 
substantial role in bank restructuring. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
At the height of the financial crisis, many countries saw no alternative 
to bailing out some of their most prominent financial institutions.1  
Governments perceived the winding down of banks through the national 
channels of insolvency as the least favorable course of action.2  Defaulting 
to insolvency could have further deteriorated market confidence in the 
affected financial institutions and could have triggered bank runs3 and panic 
in financial markets.4  Some countries had no statutory regime to deal with 
bank failures or lacked a regulatory basis for public bail-outs.5  To address 
these shortcomings, many countries hastily enacted laws6 without regard to 
 
1 DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL – UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 19–40 (2011); Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, 
Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard: Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and 
Officers Liability for Taking Excessive Risk in Germany and the United States, 40 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1433 (2010). 
2 See, e.g., Gunnar Schuster & Lars Westpfahl, Neue Wege Zur Banksanierung – Ein 
Beitrag zum Restrukturierungsgesetz (Teil I), Der Betrieb, DB 2011, 221.  Contra SKEEL, 
supra note 1, at 158–73 (arguing that reliance on insolvency regimes would have been 
preferable).  Also, the availability of public bail-out money may have removed the threat of 
losses, which made insolvency a theoretical threat at best. 
3 See, e.g., Marianne Barriaux, Market Forces: Banking Sector Hit by Northern Rock 
Fallout, GUARDIAN, Sept. 14, 2007, (Guardian Financial Pages), at 40. 
4 James B. Thomson, On Systemically Important Financial Institutions And Progressive 
Systemic Mitigation, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 135 (2010). 
5 See infra note 257 and accompanying text. 
6 U.S. Scholars have referred to recent regulatory measures such as Sarbanes Oxley and 
the Dodd-Frank Act as Quack Corporate Governance.  See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd–Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 
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international commitments, consistency, and coordination.7 
Policy makers and legislators across the globe agree that avoiding a 
repeat of the financial crisis is one of the most important legislative 
objectives.8  The United States Congress enacted The Dodd-Frank Act,9 
and the European Commission proposed various regulatory schemes to 
address many of these problems.10  A primary focus of these initiatives 
 
MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2010–11). 
7 See Grp. of Twenty [G20], The London Summit: Leaders’ Statement, ¶ 2 (April 2, 
2009), available at http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/ 
Highlights/G20_Final_London_Communique.pdf  (G20 London Summit); G20, Declaration 
on the Strengthening the Financial System (April 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/g20_summit/2009-1/annex2.html (G20 London 
Summit) [hereinafter G20 London]; Thorsten Höche, Das Restrukturierungsgesetz – Neue 
Wege in der Bankenaufsicht (mit Seitenblicken auf die Schweiz und das Vereinigte 
Königreich) [The Restructuring Act – New Ways of Banking Supervision (with side views 
of Switzerland and the United Kingdom)]; WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN: ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
WIRTSCHAFTS UND BANKRECHT 49 (2011) (Ger.); see Hans-Jürgen A. Fezerabend, Stephan 
Behnes, & Marcus Helios, Einleitung zum Restrukturierungsgesetz, Der Betrieb, DB 2011, 
Supplement No. 4, 5 (explaining the German enactment of various emergency acts following 
the Hypo Real failure in Germany). 
8 For example, during a press conference introducing the European Commission’s latest 
proposal to revise capital requirements for European banks, the Internal Market 
Commissioner Michel Barnier said: “The financial crisis has hit European families and 
businesses hard. We cannot let such a crisis occur again and we cannot allow the actions of a 
few in the financial world to jeopardize our prosperity.”  Press Release, European Comm’n, 
Commission Wants Stronger and More Responsible Banks in Europe IP/11/915 (Jul 20, 
2011) (on file with Europa), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference= IP/11/915&format=HTML&aged0&language=en&guiLanguage=en [hereinafter 
IP/11/915].  On a more global level, the G20 Summit Leaders conveyed a commitment to 
address the crisis through international cooperation and harmonization expressing a similar 
sentiment at the end of the G20 Summit in Pittsburgh in 2009.  The Leaders’ Statement notes 
that the G20 members agree “we should develop resolution tools and frameworks for the 
effective resolution of financial groups to help mitigate the disruption of financial institution 
failures and reduce moral hazard in the future.” G20, Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh 
Summit, ¶ 13 (Sept. 24–25, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/president/pdf/statement_ 20090826_en_2.pdf. 
9 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, §§ 201–17, 124 Stat. 1376, 1442–1520 (2010). 
10 DG Internal Mkt. and Serv., Technical Details of a Possible EU Framework for Bank 
Recovery and Resolution 7–10, (unpublished working document), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2011/crisis_management/consultation
_paper_en.pdf [hereinafter DG Working Document]; Commission Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on Prudential Requirements for Credit 
Institutions and Investment Firms, at 10, COM (2011) 452 final (July 20, 2011) [hereinafter 
CRD IV Regulation]; Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
the Council on the Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and 
Amending Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions, Insurance Undertakings and Investment 
Firms in a Financial Conglomerate, COM (2011) 453 final (July 20, 2011) [hereinafter 
CRD IV Directive]. 
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involved the establishment of a supervisory regime for more efficient 
regulatory oversight,11 early intervention, and early resolution to minimize 
the risk of contagion and to protect public funds.12  Germany revised a 
substantial portion of its banking laws.13  Spain changed its regulatory 
scheme for orderly bank restructuring.14  Many other European countries 
including the United Kingdom15 and Switzerland similarly adjusted their 
laws.16 
At the international level, the focus of cooperation shifted from 
corporate governance reform in a general sense toward reform of 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).17  In light of this shift 
in international cooperation and given the trend toward diverging national 
rules, regulatory arbitrage could become a risk for the competitiveness and 
stability of financial markets. This could especially hold true if countries 
cannot achieve a minimal level of convergence of international banking 
resolution and restructuring regimes.18  The European Commission has 
recognized the threat of regulatory arbitrage and conducted an impact 
assessment of harmonization in the context of revisions to the capital 
requirements for banks.19  The Commission concluded that maximum 
harmonization with some exceptions would allow the European Union to 
reduce compliance burdens, ensure a level playing field, create legal 
certainty, and achieve supervisory convergence.20 
Convergence could be especially important for resolution regimes.  
The uncoordinated reorganization and resolution of SIFIs, subject to 
 
11 See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and 
the European Central Bank, COM (2010) 579 final (Nov. 20, 2010) [hereinafter COM 
(2010) 579 final]; see also infra Part II. 
12 DG Working Document, supra note 10; see also Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376. 
13 See infra note 296 and accompanying text. 
14 B.O.E. 2009, 155 (Spain), amended by B.O.E. 2011, 43 (Spain). 
15 INDEP. COMM’N ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT CONSULTATION ON REFORM OPTIONS, 
INTERMIN REPORT, 2011, at 1 (U.K.). 
16 See Westpfahl, infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra note 63 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Höche, supra note 7. 
18 Peter Spiegel, EU warns US to speed up bank reform, FIN. TIMES, June 1, 2011, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cc0e7382-8bcb-11e0-854c-00144feab49a.html#axzz1a 
VbBDBPq.  The European Union Internal Market Commissioner Michel Barnier has even 
gone so far as to accuse the United States of “leav[ing] too much latitude for financial 
institutions,” allowing financial institutions to “circumvent globally-agreed principles.”  Id.  
In his letter to Treasury Secretary Geithner, Commissioner Barnier also called upon the 
United States to limit bonuses and pension payments for U.S. bankers, which he believes is 
essential to limiting incentives for U.S. headquartered bank executives to continue to take 
excessive risk.  Id. 
19 CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, at 5. 
20 Id. 
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multiple resolution regimes in different countries, could undermine their 
operation as a conglomerate and going concern.  Without coordination and 
convergence, it is possible that a SIFI with operations in multiple countries 
could petition for reorganization under German law, for instance, and 
emerge as a more competitive and leaner business while the same SIFI in 
the United States may be liquidated under the Boxer Amendment of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.21  The European Commission’s objective of creating 
maximum harmonization through a global “single rule book”22 may not be 
feasible.  However, setting up a legal framework for private ordering in the 
context of contingent capital23 could provide an adequate level of 
convergence and at least help ensure a level playing field. 
Contingent capital is the predefined conversion of a financial 
institution’s debt securities into equity securities.24  Contingent capital 
provides an option for the efficient restructuring and resolution of failing 
financial institutions.  It could enable a SIFI to return to solvency, prevent 
financial contagion, and maintain overall financial stability.25  It could offer 
an efficient mechanism for reorganizing SIFIs in jurisdictions that focus 
merely on liquidation rather than reorganization.26 
Recent developments in Europe suggest that contingent capital will 
play a prominent role as part of capital requirements for banks in 
 
21 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 214, 124 Stat. 1376, 1442–1520 (2010). 
22 Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment, at 5, SEC (2011) 949 final (July 
20, 2011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2011: 
0949:FIN:EN:PDF. 
23 See, e.g., BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN [BANKG] [FEDERAL LAW 
ON BANKS, SAVING AND LOANS] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952, art. 9(d) (Switz.), available at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf; see also supra art. 9, 11, 13. 
24 For purposes of this article, the term “contingent capital” or “contingent capital 
securities” (CCS) will be used.  Another name for the same concept is contingent 
convertibles (short CoCos). Contingent Capital: CoCo Nuts, ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 2009, 
http://www. economist.com/node/ 14816673?story_id=14816673; Squam Lake Working 
Grp. on Fin. Regulation, An Expedited Resolution Mechanism for Distressed Financial 
Firms: Regulatory Hybrid Securities, 2 (Council on Foreign Relations: Center for 
Geoeconomic Studies, Working Paper, 2009); MARK J. FLANNERY, STABILIZING LARGE 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS WITH CONTINGENT CAPITAL CERTIFICATES (2009); Julie Dickson, 
Superintendant, Fin. Inst. Can., Remarks at Financial Services Invitational Forum, Economic 
and Financial Turmoil: Are There Lesson for Boards? (May 6, 2010). 
25 DG Working Document, supra note 10, at Annex I. 
26 It is important to note, however, that while contingent capital may help stabilize large 
financial firms, it may not help to avoid an economic crisis in every case.  See FLANNERY, 
supra note 24; John C. Coffee, Systemic Risk after Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the 
Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 833 (2011) (“If 
a firm’s variable costs clearly exceed its revenues, and no turnaround is in sight, the firm will 
not be saved by converting its bonds into preferred stock. . . .  [R]esolution authority 
provides the superior mechanism for its liquidation. Thus, the boundaries within which 
contingent capital can feasibly work are set by the firm’s ability to recover its variable 
costs.”). 
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Switzerland27 and throughout the European Union.28  The European 
Commission has proposed various models of contingent capital and broadly 
distinguished between a comprehensive and targeted approach as a write-
down tool allowing restructuring and resolution of financial institutions.29  
The targeted approach provides a tool for the write down and conversion of 
financial institutions’ liabilities.  The targeted approach could provide 
resolution authorities with additional flexibility if a failing institution 
cannot be wound up under the respective national insolvency regime.30 
The European Commission promulgated a new approach in a 
directive31 and regulation32 proposal implementing Basel III and revising 
the capital requirement rules in the European Union.  The Commission 
recognizes contingent capital as a so-called “Additional Tier 1 
instrument,”33 subject to full and permanent write down at the point of non-
viability.34  The European Union-wide recognition of contingent capital as 
Tier 1 capital may further incentivize national governments to promulgate 
contingent capital standards.  The Commission proposal leaves sufficient 
discretion for national legislators to implement their own contingent capital 
standards.  The German government has proposed a change to the German 
Corporation Act to implement provisions for contingent capital.35  The 
Swiss and English legislators have taken similar approaches.  In the United 
States, the Dodd-Frank Act mandates a study on the feasibility of 
contingent capital.36 
 
27 See, e.g., BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN [BANKG] [FEDERAL LAW 
ON BANKS, SAVING AND LOANS] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952, art. 9(d) (Switz.), available at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf; Press Release, Fed. Dep’t of Fin., 
Strengthening Financial Sector Stability (too big to fail) (July 12, 2011), 
http://www.efd.admin. ch/dokumentation/zahlen/00579/00607/02255/index.html?lang=en 
[hereinafter Fed. Dep’t of Fin. Press Release]. 
28 See DG Working Document, supra note 10; see CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10; 
see CRD IV Directive, supra note 10. 
29 DG Working Document, supra note 10, at 87–89. 
30 Id. at 86. 
31 CRD IV Directive, supra note 10. 
32 CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10. 
33 Id. art. 49(1)(n). 
34 Id. at 20 (“(27) In line with the decision of the BCBS [the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision], as endorsed by the GHOS [Central Bank Governors and Heads of 
Supervision] on 10 January 2011, all Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments of an 
institution should be fully and permanently written down or converted fully into Common 
Equity Tier 1 capital at the point of non-viability of the institution.”). 
35 Referentenentwurf des Bundesministeriums der Justiz, Gesetz zur Änderung des 
Aktiengesetzes, available at http://www2.nwb.de/portal/content/ir/downloads/217907/RefE_ 
Aktienrechtsnovelle_2011.pdf?referrer=www.google.com (April 14, 2011). 
36 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 115, 124 Stat. 1376, 1404 (2010). 
(c) CONTINGENT CAPITAL.— (1) STUDY REQUIRED.—The Council shall 
conduct a study of the feasibility, benefits, costs, and structure of a contingent 
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This article provides an overview of regulatory proposals for the 
restructuring of financial institutions and explains the role contingent 
capital may play in this context.  We point out pertinent issues that require 
resolution before regulatory proposals may be implemented.  We also 
suggest possible approaches for some of the open issues by providing a 
comparative perspective of the European Union and national approaches.  
The first part of this article briefly examines international initiatives on the 
subject of bank recovery and resolution.  The second part reviews the 
actions taken by the European Union and national legislators in 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Germany.  The third part discusses 
contingent capital in European bank restructuring.  The fourth part 
evaluates contingent capital as both a preventative tool in European bank 
restructuring and as a part of bank recovery and resolution.  In the final part, 
we consider triggers and other design features of contingent capital, identify 
problems, and suggest possible solutions.  We emphasize the possible role 
of international convergence. 
II.  INTERNATIONAL MITIGATION INITIATIVES, RESOLUTION 
TOOLS AND FRAMEWORKS 
The discussion of the European approach to bank recovery and 
resolution would not be complete without considering some of the 
international initiatives taken since the financial crisis.  As in most 
countries affected by the financial crisis, European nations first attempted to 
deal with the results of the crisis at national levels.  However, as many bank 
failures, such as Lehman Brothers,37 Fortis,38 Icelandic banks,39 Northern 
 
capital requirement for nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of 
Governors and bank holding companies described in subsection (a), which study 
shall include— 
(A) an evaluation of the degree to which such requirement would enhance the 
safety and soundness of companies subject to the requirement, promote the 
financial stability of the United States, and reduce risks to United States tax- 
payers; 
(B) an evaluation of the characteristics and amounts of contingent capital that 
should be required; 
(C) an analysis of potential prudential standards that should be used to determine 
whether the contingent capital of a company would be converted to equity in times 
of financial stress; 
(D) an evaluation of the costs to companies, the effects on the structure and 
operation of credit and other financial markets, and other economic effects of 
requiring contingent capital; 
(E) an evaluation of the effects of such requirement on the international 
competitiveness of companies subject to the requirement and the prospects for 
international coordination in establishing such requirement; and 
(F) recommendations for implementing regulations. 
Id. 
37 US Banking Crisis Financiers Have Put the World at Risk, HERALD (Glasgow), Sept. 
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Rock,40 or Hypo Real Estate Holding41 have demonstrated, national 
measures proved ineffective and failed to address cross-border banking 
operations or contagion.42 In addition, national measures varied greatly.43  
Most national measures took the form of public bail-outs without broad 
international consensus,44 thereby increasing the threat of international 
regulatory arbitrage as well as negatively impacting the global 
competitiveness of national financial markets.45 
The 2009 G20 Summits in London46 and Pittsburgh47 were the first 
international response with the goal of coordinating policy actions at an 
international level.  Following the G20 Summit, the third Basel Accord 
established the Basel III requirements.48  Since the 2010 G20 Summit in 
Seoul, the international focus has shifted toward addressing the risk that 
 
16, 2008, at 14. 
38 Ian Traynor, Belgium Acts to Prevent Financial Group’s Collapse: Governments 
Agree to Pour Euros 11bn into Fortis, GUARDIAN, Sept. 29, 2008, (Guardian Financial 
Pages), at 26. 
39 Yves Smith, The first casualty of the crisis: Iceland, NAKED CAPITALISM (Nov. 12, 
2008), www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/11/first-casualty-of-crisis-iceland.html. 
40 Marianne Barriaux, Market Forces: Banking Sector Hit by Northern Rock Fallout,  
GUARDIAN, Sept. 15, 2007, (Guardian Financial Pages), at 40. 
41 Carter Dougherty et al., Financial Crises Spread in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, 
at A1. 
42 DG Working Document, supra note 10. 
43 During the crisis many countries introduced emergency laws to establish some existing 
legal basis for state aid to national and global systemically important financial institutions. 
See, e.g., the approach taken in Germany by enacting the Financial Market Stabilization 
Law, Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz [FMStG], Oct. 17, 2008, BGBL. I  at 1982; The 
Amended Financial Market Stabilization Law, Finanzmarktstabilisierungsergänzungsgesetz 
[FMStErgG], Apr. 7, 2009, BGBL. I at 725; Law to Improve the Financial Market and 
Insurance Regulatory Authority, Gesetz zur Stärkung der Finanzmarkt und der 
Versicherungsaufsicht [FMVAStärkG], July 29, 2009, BGBL. I at 2305. 
44 Sharon E. Foster, Too Big to Fail, Too Small to Compete: Systemic Risk Should be 
Addressed Through Antitrust Law, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 31, 33, 49 (2010). 
45 In the European Union, until the fall of 2010, state aid to support banks amounted to as 
much as 13% GDP.  See Press Release, European Comm’n, An EU Framework for Crisis 
Management in the Financial Sector, Memo/10/506 (Oct. 20, 2010), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/506&format=HTML& 
aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
46 See G20 London, supra note 7; see Höche, supra note 7; see Fezerabend et al., supra 
note 7. 
47 G20, Pittsburgh Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy (Sept. 15, 
2009) [hereinafter Pittsburgh Summit].  In Pittsburgh, the leaders agreed that they “should 
develop resolution tools and frameworks for the effective resolution of financial groups to 
help mitigate the disruption of financial institution failures and reduce moral hazard in the 
future.”  Pittsburgh Summit, supra, ¶ 13. 
48 Bank for Int’l Settlements [BIS], Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Consultative 
Document: Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks & Banking 
Systems, (Dec. 2010, rev. June 2011) [hereinafter BIS III]. 
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SIFIs pose to global financial markets. 
At the London and Pittsburgh Summit the leaders of the G20 also 
charged the Financial Stability Board (FSB)49 with presenting 
recommendations for the development of this framework.50  The FSB 
submitted its first major report to the G20 in the fall of 201051 and 
recommended the implementation of internationally consistent bank capital 
and liquidity standards based on the third Basel Accord.52  The FSB further 
proposed the increase of supervision and regulatory measures to deal with 
SIFIs.  As part of a new regulatory regime, the FSB also suggested the 
requirement of higher loss absorbency measures for SIFIs that reflect the 
higher risk that these financial institutions might pose to the global financial 
system.53 Finally, the FSB report addressed a needed reform of the OTC 
derivative markets54 and proposed the general increase in supervisory 
intensity and effectiveness of all financial markets.55 
The G20 leaders followed the FSB recommendations and endorsed the 
Basel III requirements at the Seoul Summit in November 2010.56  All G20 
members have since agreed to implement Basel III.  The goal is to 
implement national legislation by January 1, 2013, with an enforcement 
date of January 1, 2019.57  Basel III introduces new capital and liquidity 
standards and applies to all G20 banks.58  Basel III specifically attempts to 
prevent banks from using off-balance sheet vehicles and risk weighting 
 
49 Financial Stability Board [FSB], http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/.  The 
Financial Stability Board is an international body that has been established to coordinate the 
work of national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies.  The FSB 
develops and promotes the implementation of effective regulatory and supervisory policies 
for the financial sector.  Members of the FSB are national regulatory authorities, national and 
international financial institutions, associations, committees, and experts in the financial 
sector.  For a list of members, see http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/members/links.htm. 
50 Pittsburgh Summit, supra note 47, ¶ 13. 
51 Fin. Stability Bd., Progress Since the Washington Summit in the Implementation of the 
G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability: Report of the Financial 
Stability Board to G20 Leaders, (Nov. 8, 2010), 1–12, http://www.financialstabilityboard. 
org/ publications/r_101111b.pdf. 
52 Id. at 3–5. 
53 Id. at 6–7. 
54 Id. at 12–15. 
55 Id. at 15–20. 
56 Grp. Of Twenty [G20], Leaders’ Declaration: The Seoul Summit, at ¶ 13 (Nov. 11–12, 
2010), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/11/seoulsummit_declaration.pdf 
[hereinafter G20 Seoul Summit]. 
57 Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening 
Financial Stability: Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors, Fin. Stability Bd. (Apr. 10, 2011), at 1, http://www.financial 
stabilityboard.org/publications/r_110415a.pdf. 
58 Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 
439 (2011). 
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methods to hide the true size of their balance sheet.59  At its core, Basel III 
establishes the following capital ratio requirements: (1) tier 1 capital 6%, 
(2) common equity 4.5%, and (3) total capital 8%.60  More importantly, the 
Basel Accord establishes the requirement of capital conservation buffers to 
be drawn upon during a financial crisis.61  Under Basel II, the total capital 
requirement for banks were merely 8%, i.e., 2% common equity tier 1 
capital, 2 % other qualifying tier 1 capital, and 4% tier 2 capital.  Starting in 
2019, banks will be required to hold a total common equity plus 
conservation buffers of 7% amounting to a total capital plus conservation 
buffer of 10.5%.62  Adding countercyclical buffers of up to 2.5 % and SIFI 
capital surcharges, the total capital required under Basel III could reach 
around 13%. 
Since the endorsement of the Basel Accord and following the 
recommendations of the FSB, international attention seems to have shifted 
away from the international coordination of national bank resolution 
regimes toward regulating systemically important financial institutions.63  
Early in 2011, at the Paris meeting of the G20 finance ministers and central 
bank governors, the group agreed to focus on systemically important 
financial institutions of significance for the global financial markets (G-
SIFIs) as opposed to financial institutions of significance only in their 
respective home countries and identified a number of issues to work on.64 
The group identified the classification of G-SIFIs as well as the need 
for a comprehensive multi-tiered framework with more supervisory 
oversight and a more effective cross border resolution regime as the most 
important issues to address.65  As part of a viable resolution regime for G-
SIFIs, the group considered the possibility of capital surcharges, contingent 
capital, and bail-in instruments as statutory write-down tools within 
resolution and systemic levies.66  To expedite the work on G-SIFIs, the 
 
59 Id. at 444. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 446. 
62 Id. 
63 See, e.g., Höche, supra note7. 
64 G20, Communiqué, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 
February 18–19, 2011, ¶ 6, http://www.g20.org/pub_communiques.aspx (last visited July 18, 
2011) (Paris) [hereinafter G20].  G-SIFIs are global systemically important financial 
institutions as opposed to regional or national systemically important financial institutions.  
For example, the two biggest Swiss banks, UBS and Credit Swiss, are both global players, 
while at the same time being Switzerland’s biggest banks.  Conversely, Japan, on a national 
level, has various systemically important financial institutions, but these Japanese banks are 
not of similar global significance.  See, e.g., Patrick Jenkins, G20 Draws Up Two Tier Bank 
Plan, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ff3f3a4a-ec46-11df-9e11-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1aQH71R8b. 
65 G20, supra note 64, ¶ 6. 
66 Id. 
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group asked the FSB to deliver first recommendations on G-SIFI 
classification and loss absorbency before the G20 summit in the fall of 
2011.67  The preliminary factors established to categorize G-SIFIs, which 
may also include insurers, are (1) global activities, (2) size, (3) 
interconnectedness, (4) substitutability and (5) complexity.68  In addition, as 
an alternative to the requirement of higher loss absorbency capacity, the 
FSB considered a combination of capital surcharges and “bail-inables”.69  
In the context of bank resolution tools and regimes, the FSB has also set up 
a Bail-in Working Group, which is reviewing technical aspects and 
financial stability implications of both contractual and statutory bail-in 
instruments and mechanisms.70  The FSB published a consultation paper on 
bank resolution of SIFIs in July 2011.71 
III.  EUROPEAN BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION 
The European Union initiated a number of long- and short-term 
initiatives since the financial crisis.72  Most of the initiatives were aimed at 
specific areas of concern that required immediate attention. One example is 
the European Union deposit guarantee scheme.73  The long-term initiatives 
were aimed at establishing a more comprehensive response to the financial 
crisis.  The initiatives included establishing an effective European System 
of Financial Supervisors,74 the European Union framework for crisis 
management in the financial sector75 and revision of the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD IV).76 
 
67 FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 57, at 2. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 2. 
70 Id. at 3. 
71 Fin. Stability Bd.,  Consultative Document, Effective Resolution of Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions: Recommendations and Timelines, (July 19, 2011), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110719.pdf.; Fin. Stability Bd.,  
Comments Received on the FSB Consultative Document on Effective Resolution of SIFIs, 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/c_110909.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2012). 
72 The sovereign debt crisis in Europe is not the focus of this paper.  Although clearly 
related to the financial crisis and public bank bail-outs, a comprehensive discussion of the 
issues and latest developments related to the sovereign debt crisis of Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, and the actions taken by the European Union and IMF would go far beyond the 
focus of this paper.  As such, we will also not discuss the European Financial Stability 
Facility (ESFS) or the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
73 Council Directive 2009/14, 2009 O.J. (L 68) 3 (EU). 
74 Council Regulation 1092/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 1; Council Regulation 1093/2010, 
2010 O.J. (L 331) 12; Council Regulation 1094/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 48; Council 
Regulation 1095/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 84. 
75 COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11. 
76 See, e.g., European Commission, Possible Further Changes to the Capital 
Requirements Directive, at 1–2 (Comm’n Services, Working Staff Paper, 2010), available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/crd4/consultation_paper_en.pdf 
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A.  European Union Initiatives 
As one of its first initiatives, the European Union amended the Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes Directive 2009/14/EC in the spring of 2009.77  The goal 
of the amendment was to restore consumer confidence and protection after 
the turmoil of the crisis.78  The directive applies to all credit institutions in 
the European Union and requires all institutions to join a Deposit Guarantee 
Scheme (DGS).79  Member States are required to ensure that all bank 
deposits are secured at 100.000 euro,80 which is an increase of 80.000 euro 
over prior Union requirements.81  In addition, a coverage payout cannot be 
delayed for more than 20 working days.82  Deposit guarantee schemes are 
further required to be regularly supervised and must perform stress tests.83 
Following the findings of the de Larosiere Report,84 the European 
Commission also adopted a recommendation on remuneration in the 
financial services sector85 and a recommendation on directors’ pay.86  With 
a view towards long-term profitability and performance, the Commission 
suggested that Member States regulate remuneration of risk-taking staff and 
seek a balance between core pay and bonuses.87  The Commission also 
 
[hereinafter Comm’n Services]. 
77 Council Directive 2009/14, 2009 O.J. (L 68) 3 (EU). 
78 Press Release, European Commission, Commission Proposes Package to Boost 
Consumer Protection and Confidence in Financial Services (July 12, 2010), http://ec.europa. 
eu/internal_market/bank/guarantee/index_en.htm. 
79 Council Directive 94/19, art. 3, 1994 O.J. (L 35) 5, 8.  However, deposits other than 
consumer deposits, such as deposits of financial institutions, public authorities, structured 
investment products, and debt certificates are now specifically excluded from coverage; see 
also Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes at 2, 6–9 COM (2010) 368 final (July 12, 2010). 
80 See Council Directive, supra note 81, at art. 1(a). 
81 Id. pmbl. ¶ 3. 
82 Id. pmbl. ¶ 10. 
83 Id. pmbl. ¶ 6. 
84 The de Larosière Grp., The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, 
Brussels, at 31 (Feb. 25, 2009) (chaired by Jacques de Larosière), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf [hereinafter 
The de Larosière Grp.].  The de Larosière Group was a group of experts asked by the 
European Commission to provide advice on the future of European financial regulation and 
supervision.  The work of the group resulted in the so-called de Larosière Report.  Members 
of the group were Jacques de Larosière, Leszek Balcerowicz, Otmar Issing, Rainer Masera, 
Callum McCarthy, Lars Nyberg, José Pérez, and Onno Ruding. 
85 Press Release, European Commission, Financial Services Sector Pay: Commission Set 
Out Remuneration of Risk-Taking Staff in Financial Institutions (Apr. 29, 2009), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/674 [hereinafter Press 
Release]; Commission Recommendation On Remuneration Policies in the Financial 
Services Sector, C(2009) 3159 (Apr. 30, 2009). 
86 See Press Release, supra note 85; see also Council Directive 2011/61, 2011 O.J. (L 
174) 1, 70 (EC). 
87 Kaal, supra note 58, at 401; Press Release, supra note 85. 
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deemed a claw-back option for bonuses a necessary requirement88 and 
asked that Member States make remuneration policies transparent for all 
parties involved.89  Similar recommendations followed for directors’ pay, 
including a limit on golden parachutes and a ban on severance pay in case 
of failure.90 
Another important European Union initiative was the adoption of 
Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM).91  
After an initial proposal in the spring of 2009, the directive went into force 
on July 21, 2011.  The AIFM sector in the European Union, which 
represented assets of around 2 trillion euro at the end of 2008, includes 
hedge funds, private equity funds, and commodity funds, among others.92  
The directive regulates AIFM and applies to funds managing 100 million 
euros or more.93  Some estimates suggest that this applies to 90% of assets 
managed by hedge funds domiciled in the European Union.94  The directive 
regulates all major sources of risk of AFIM,95 includes various transparency 
rules,96 and sets corporate governance standards on how to manage risk, 
liquidity, and conflicts of interest.97  Finally, the directive aims to establish 
a passport regime with a transitional period of three years for non-EU hedge 
funds in order to perform management and marketing activities in the 
European Union.98 
B.  Long-Term Initiatives of the European Union 
Among the most important long-term initiatives are the establishment 
of a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS)99 and the 
 
88 Press Release, supra note 85; see also Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, 
Economics, Politics, and the International Principles for Sound Compensation, 64 VAND. L. 
REV. 431, 477 (2011). 
89 Press Release, supra note 85. 
90 Press Release, supra note 85; Communication from the Commission accompanying 
Commission Recommendation complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 
2005/162/EC, COM (2009) 211 final (April 30, 2009). 
91 Council Directive 2011/61, supra note 86, at 1.  For a critical assessment, see Kaal, 
supra note 58, at 396–97 (assessing the influence of the Directive on the alternative 
investment community’s competitiveness and suggesting hedge fund regulation through 
Basel III). 
92 Press Release, European Commission, Financial Services: Commission proposes EU 
framework (Apr. 29, 2009), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= 
IP/09/669&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en [hereinafter Press 
Release: Financial Services]. 
93 Council Directive 2011/61, supra note 86, art. 3, at 15. 
94 Press Release: Financial Services, supra note 92. 
95 Council Directive 2011/61, supra note 86, at 1, ¶ 2. 
96 Id. art. 22. 
97 Id. art. 15. 
98 Id. pmbl. ¶ 4. 
99 Council Regulation 1093/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12; see infra text accompanying 
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Commission Communication on the European Union framework for crisis 
management in the financial sector.100  The latter resulted in the DG 
Internal Market and Service Working Document on technical details of a 
possible European Union framework for bank recovery and resolution,101 as 
well as the most recent Commission proposal on the revision of the Capital 
Requirements Directive.102 
1.  The European System of Financial Supervisors 
Since January 1, 2011, the European Union has a new European 
System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS).103  Many details about the powers 
of the ESFS remain unclear, but the introduction of this new European 
Union supervisory architecture generally followed recommendations made 
in the de Larosiere Report.104  The Report recognized the need to strengthen 
European supervisory arrangements and recommended the establishment of 
a Union-level body charged with overseeing the financial system as a 
whole.105  The prior system of financial service committees106 only played 
an advisory role with no real power,107 and Union-wide supervision was at 
best fragmented, inconsistent and ineffective.108 
It is questionable whether the ESFS may be able to address all of the 
identified shortcomings.  The system is primarily aimed at establishing a 
European single rule book, upgrading the quality and consistency of 
 
note 103. 
100 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the 
European Central Bank, COM (2010) 579 final (Nov. 20, 2010). 
101 DG Working Document, supra note 10. 
102 IP/11/915, supra note 8; CRD IV Directive, supra note 10; DG Working Document, 
supra note 10. 
103 Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 74, ¶ 69. 
104 The de Larosière Grp., supra note 84. 
105 Council Regulation 1092/2010, supra note 74, pmbl. ¶¶ 3–4. 
106 The so-called “Lamfalussy level committees” consist of the Committee of the 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), the Committee of European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Committee (CEIOPS), and the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR). 
107 Commission Decision of 23 January 2009 establishing the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (EC), 2009 O.J. (L 25) 23 [hereinafter CEBS Decision]; Commission 
Decision of 23 January 2009 establishing the Committee of European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Supervisors (EC), 2009 O.J. (L 25) 28, [hereinafter CEIOPS 
Decision]; Commission Decision of 23 January 2009 establishing the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (EC), 2009 O.J. (L 25) 18. [hereinafter CESR Decision].  
See also Press Release, European Commission, European System of Financial Supervisors 
(ESFS): Frequently Asked Questions (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/404&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en [hereinafter Press Release FAQ]. 
108 See, e.g., Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 74, pmbl. ¶ 8; Press Release 
FAQ, supra note 107. 
Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring 
32:191 (2012) 
205 
national supervision, and strengthening the oversight of cross-border 
groups.109  Although the ESFS remains limited to a Union-wide early 
exchange of information, it improves the prior supervisory system by 
harmonizing technical standards, coordinating Union-wide supervisory 
actions, and providing some decision-making powers in emergency 
situations.110 
The European System of Financial Supervisors is considered an 
integrated network of national and European Union supervisory 
authorities.111  It distinguishes between macro- and micro-prudential 
oversight.112  The ESFS consists of the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) and three European Supervisory Authorities: the European Banking 
Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), 
and the European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority 
(EIOPA).113  The ESAs replace the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors,114 the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Supervisors,115 and the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators.116 
 
109 Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 74, pmbl. ¶ 5. 
110 Id. art. 18. 
111 Id. pmbl. ¶ 9. 
112 Id. 
113 The ESA also includes a Joint Committee of the European Authorities (Joint 
Committee) and all competent or supervisory in the Member States.  See, e.g., id. art. 2, at ¶ 
2(e)–(f).  This article does not focus on all ESAs or include a comprehensive discussion of 
the role of the ESFS.  The goal of the article is simply to provide an overview of the ESFS in 
the context of actions taken by the European Union in response to the financial crisis. 
114 CEBS Decision, supra note 107. 
115 CEIOPS Decision, supra note 107. 
116 CESR Decision, supra note 107. 
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The European Systemic Risk Board  (ESRB) is the systemic risk 
regulator117 of the Union charged with the task of monitoring and assessing 
systemic risk in the Union.118  It is comparable to the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council under Dodd-Frank.119  The ESRB is tasked with the duty 
of developing a risk dashboard and a color code for interested parties to 
help them assess the nature of systemic risk.120  It will also work closely 
with the European Supervisory Authorities in issuing recommendations121 
and warnings.122  It cooperates with the Bank of International Settlement 
(BIS), the Financial Supervisory Board (FSB), and the International 
 
117 Council Regulation 1092/2010, supra note 74, pmbl. ¶ 15, art. 3. 
118 Id. art. 15. 
119 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); Brief Summary of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, S. Comm. on Banking, 
Hous., and Urban Affairs, available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/ 
070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf. 
120 Council Regulation 1092/2010, supra note 74, pmbl. ¶ 18; see also Jean-Claude 
Trichet, Mervyn King, & Andrea Enria, European Systemic Risk Bd., Introductory Remarks 
to the Press Conference (June 22, 2011), available at http://www.esrb.europa.eu/news/ 
pr/2011/html/is110622.en.html; Ralph Atkins, Debt Crisis Flashing Warning Signs, says 
ECB chief, FIN. TIMES, June 22, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/87831328-9cfe-11e0-
8678-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1bRdPbQqQ. 
121 Council Regulation 1092/2010, supra note 74, art. 17. 
122 Id. art. 16. 
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Monetary Fund (IMF)123 in developing international standards and 
assessing global risk.124 The President of the European Central Bank will 
chair the ESRB for the first 5 years.125 The ESRB will also have two Vice-
Chairs,126 a General Board,127 a Steering Committee,128 and two advisory 
committees129 supporting its work.130  At the European Union level, the 
ESRB is accountable and reports directly to the Council and the European 
Parliament.131 
Conversely to the ESRB, the European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs)132 oversee the micro-prudential performance of their respective 
industries with the goal of fostering convergence and promoting 
coordination among the European Union Member States.133  Specifically, 
the ESAs work to guarantee a level playing field and prevent regulatory 
arbitrage to strengthen international supervisory coordination.134  In 
addition, the Authorities can settle cross-border disputes among national 
supervisory authorities with binding effect.135  The Authorities also serve as 
an independent advisory body to the European Parliament, the Council, and 
the Commission.136  The principal decision-making body of the ESAs is 
chaired by a person with no voting power and is comprised of a board of 
supervisors that includes the heads of the relevant competent supervisory 
authorities in the member state.137 
The ESAs are supported by a Joint Committee of European 
Supervisory Authorities.138  The Joint Committee is composed of the 
chairpersons of the ESAs and serves as a coordinating forum to ensure 
cross-sectoral consistency and the exchange of information with the 
 
123 Id. pmbl. ¶¶ 7–8. 
124 Id. pmbl. ¶ 9. 
125 Id. art. 5. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. art. 6. 
128 Id. art. 11. 
129 Id. arts. 12–13. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. art. 19. 
132 See Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 78.  See also supra text accompanying 
note 103.  The ESAs are: the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA), and the European Insurance and Occupational Pension 
Authority (EIOPA). 
133 See, e.g., Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 74, pmbl. ¶ 11, art. 19. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. pmbl. ¶ 32. 
136 Id. art. 45. 
137 Id. art. 52; see also id. art. 40 (Representatives of the Commission, the ESRB, the 
ECB, and the other respective ESAs participate as observers). 
138 Id. art. 54. 
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ESRB.139  The Joint Committee is also responsible for settling possible 
disputes between the ESAs.140 A Board of Appeal reviews decisions by the 
ESAs.141 The European Court of Justice is the ultimate authority to review 
decisions by the ESAs.142  All competent authorities as well as any natural 
and legal person involved in or subject to the ESA decision may file 
appeals.143  But, the European Commission may ultimately curtail all 
powers transferred to the ESAs.144 
Among the ESAs, the European Banking Authority (EBA)145 has the 
most prominent role.  In cooperation with the ESRB, the EBA initiates and 
coordinates Union-wide stress tests and peer reviews of financial 
institutions.146  It also contributes to “developing methods for the resolution 
of failing financial institutions, in particular those that may pose a systemic 
risk, in ways which avoid contagion and allow them to be wound down in 
an orderly and timely manner, including, where applicable, coherent and 
robust funding mechanisms as appropriate.”147  Moreover, the EBA 
supervises the implementation of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
Directive,148 ensuring that all national guarantee schemes are adequately 
funded.149 
The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA),150 on the 
other hand, supervises any legislation and any matters related to the 
Alternative Investment Funds Managers Directive151 including issues of 
corporate governance, auditing and financial reporting.152  The ESMA 
oversees and takes appropriate actions regarding takeover bids in the 
financial sector, clearing and settlement, as well as derivative issues.153  In 
addition to the limitation of its power by the Commission, the ESMA is, 




141 Id. art. 58 (stating that the Board of Appeal is a joint body of all ESAs). 
142 Id. art. 61. 
143 Id. art. 60. 
144 Id. art. 1, at ¶ 4; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 74, art. 1, at ¶ 4; Council 
Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 74, art. 1, at ¶ 4 (“4. The provisions of this Regulation are 
without prejudice to the powers of the Commission, in particular under Article 258 TFEU, to 
ensure compliance with Union law.”). 
145 Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 74. 
146 Id. ¶ 43. 
147 Id. art. 27. 
148 Council Directive 2009/14, 2009 O.J. (L 68) 3 (EU). 
149 Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 74, art. 26. 
150 Id. 
151 See Council Directive 2011/61, supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
152 Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 74, art. 1. 
153 Id. 




The European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority 
(EIOPA)155 is comparable to the Office of National Insurance in the U.S.156  
The EIOPA is entrusted with the supervision of all insurance and 
reinsurance undertakings, insurance intermediaries, and pension funds.157  
Analogous to the EBA158 and the ESMA,159 the EIOPA is also charged with 
taking a leading role in consumer protection by promoting “transparency, 
simplicity and fairness in the market for consumer financial products or 
services across the internal market.”160  Overall, the EIOPA may be 
considered the European Supervisory Authority with the least power when 
compared to the EBA or the ESMA.  Not only is the EIOPA subject to the 
limitations posed by the supervisory powers of the Commission and the 
EBA, the EIOPA is also prohibited from encroaching on Member State 
powers as they relate to pension funds.161 
2.  Proposed Framework for Crisis Management 
The most important and far reaching initiatives of the European Union 
stem from the European Commission communications on crisis 
management in the financial sector since 2009.162  These communications 
resulted in the latest legislative proposal from July 20, 2011,163 on the 
revisions of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV).164 
 
154 Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 74, art. 1, at ¶ 2 (“. . . without prejudice to 
the competence of the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) in 
terms of prudential supervision . . . .”). 
155 Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 74. 
156 National Insurance Act of 2007, H.R. 3200, 110th Cong. § 1101 (2007) (establishing 
the Office of National Insurance). 
157 Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 74, art. 1, at ¶¶ 2–4. 
158 Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 74, art. 9. 
159 Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 74, art. 9. 
160 Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 74, art. 9, ¶ 1. 
161 Id. art 2, at ¶ 4. 
162 COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11.  See also Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the 
European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank, COM (2009) 561 final (Oct. 20, 
2009); Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the European Central Bank, COM (2010) 
254 final (May 26, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/ 
crisis_management/index_en.htm#funds.  The European Parliament also provided 
recommendations on cross-border crisis management in the banking sector (so-called 
Ferreira Report).  Draft Report with Recommendations to the Commission on Cross-Border 
Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, Comm. on Economic and Monetary Affairs, 
2010/2006 (INI) (Apr. 7, 2010) (by Elisa Ferreira). 
163 See Comm’n Services, supra note 76. 
164 See, e.g., CRD IV Regulation and CRD IV Directive, supra note 10, at 10; see also id. 
at 1–2. 
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Based on the premise that public bail-outs of financial institutions 
should never happen again165 and that banks must be allowed to fail like 
any other business, the Commission developed a framework for prevention, 
crisis management, and resolution of banks.166  At the early intervention 
stage, the Commission proposed to reinforce the supervisory regime under 
the current Capital Requirements Directives (CRD),167 adding more robust 
standards and more intrusive intervention tools.168  The Commission further 
identified the drafting of recovery and resolution plans (living wills) as 
essential elements of effective crisis management.169  The Commission 
noted that: 
A requirement for up to date resolution plans would apply to all 
credit institutions and investment firms covered by the [resolution] 
regime, with the aim of ensuring the planning necessary to enable the 
business of the bank or firm to be transferred or wound down in an 
orderly manner in the event of its failure.170 
The content of such plans may include details on group structure, 
intra-group guarantees, service level agreements, and other operational 
information.171  Article 136 of the CRD provides additional preventative 
powers.172  Specifically, the ability of supervisory authorities to limit or 
modify risk exposure, to increase reporting, to restrict or to prohibit certain 
 
165 In this context, the European Commission has approved €4.6 trillion of state aid 
measures to financial institutions, of which more than €2 trillion were effectively used in 
2008 and 2009.  See, e.g., Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission Wants Stronger 
and More Responsible Banks (July 20, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/915&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN& 
guiLanguage=en.  In total, European Union governments paid state aid amounting to 
approximately 30% of the combined EU GDP, while the aid used until December 2009 
amounts to 13%.  See, e.g., COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11, at 2. 
166 COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11; DG Working Document, supra note 10. 
167 See Council Directive 2006/48, 2006 O.J. (L 177) 1 (EC); Council Directive 2006/49, 
2006 O.J. (L 177) 201 (EC). 
168 COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11, at 5. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 6. 
171 Id. 
172 Council Directive 2006/48, supra note 167, at 50 (“Article 136 - 1.  Competent 
authorities shall require any credit institution that does not meet the requirements of this 
Directive to take the necessary actions or steps at an early stage to address the situation. 
For those purposes, the measures available to the competent authorities shall include the 
following: (a) obliging credit institutions to hold own funds in excess of the minimum level 
laid down in Article 75; (b) requiring the reinforcement of the arrangements, processes, 
mechanisms and strategies implemented to comply with Articles 22 and 123; (c) requiring 
credit institutions to apply a specific provisioning policy or treatment of assets in terms of 
own funds requirements; (d) restricting or limiting the business, operations or network of 
credit institutions; and (e) requiring the reduction of the risk inherent in the activities, 
products and systems of credit institutions . . .”). 
Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring 
32:191 (2012) 
211 
activities, and to require a change to the legal corporate structure and 
business arrangement.173 
While many of these steps mimic developments at the international 
level174 and in the United States under Dodd-Frank,175 the European 
approach is different with regard to recovery and the determination of when 
a bank should be subject to wind down.176  The Commission recognized 
that a bank’s breach of capital requirements might not necessarily mean that 
the institution is encountering serious problems which inevitably would 
lead to failure.177  More importantly, the Commission proposal balanced the 
interest of property rights of shareholders and creditors with liquidation as 
an intervention in the public interest and concluded that resolution actions 
may not be taken before all other realistic recovery options are exhausted.178 
Although primarily mentioned in the context of SIFIs,179 the 
Commission recognized that supplementary mechanisms enabling a 
financial institution to reorganize and continue as a going concern180 may 
also be necessary to protect financial stability and to prevent anti-
competitive results.181  While focused on making the threat of market exit a 
realistic option, the Commission did not consider liquidation as the only or 
best option for failing banks.182  The Commission therefore not only 
recognized that reorganization is an important option during crisis 
management in order to maintain crucial activities, but also that it may 
allow banks to stabilize, return to viability, and stay in the market place 
without the need for public bail-outs.  The supplementary mechanism that 
the Commission specifically identified as a reorganization option is the debt 
write-down tool that allows the contractual or statutory conversion of debt 
to equity.183 
 
173 COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11, at 6. 
174 FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 57, at 1.  See also FIN. STABILITY BD., G20 Monitoring 
Progress – United States (Sept.. 2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ 
publications/ r_110401x.pdf; FIN. STABILITY BD., G20 Monitoring Progress Progress – 
Germany (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications 
/r_110401g.pdf. 
175 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 115(d), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (“resolution 
plans”). 
176 See, e.g., id. §§ 214, 1442–1520. 
177 COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11, at 7. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 11.  The Commission refers to systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs) as large, complex financial institutions (LCFIs). 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 8–9 (“The Commission will consider what reform of bank insolvency law is 
necessary to ensure that failed banks can be liquidated as a second phase . . .with the ultimate 
aim of ensuring that liquidation is a realistic option.”). 
183 Id. at 12; see also DG Working Document, supra note 10, at 51, 55, 86. 
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The Commission considered the option of a statutory write-down 
supplemented by either a comprehensive or targeted approach for additional 
debt-equity conversion.184  The statutory debt write-down proposed by the 
Commission would be exercisable by any national resolution authority 
when an institution meets a predefined trigger condition for entry into 
resolution.185  At that point, the authority would have the power to write 
down all equity and either write down subordinate debt or convert the debt 
into equity (so-called statutory core power).186  Under the comprehensive 
approach, a discretionary amount of senior debt necessary to return the 
institution to solvency could also be converted into equity, in addition to the 
prior conversion of subordinated debt under the statutory core power.187 
The alternative to the Commission’s comprehensive approach 
considered by the Commission is the targeted approach.188  The targeted 
approach combines statutory and contractual elements of debt conversion.  
Prior to any financial distress, national resolution authorities would first 
require financial institutions to issue a fixed volume of “bail-inable” debt.189  
This fixed volume would be converted into equity on a statutory trigger, in 
addition to the conversion of debt under the statutory core power.190  In 
sum, the Commission proposed to establish haircuts for all equity 
supplemented by a debt conversion of both subordinate and senior debt 
when the financial institution is in danger of insolvency.  The ultimate goal 
of this supplementary debt conversion mechanism is to “ensure that an 
institution in difficulty returns to viability so as to maintain market and 
creditor confidence when the markets next open.”191 
Finally, analogous to the Dodd-Frank Act,192 the Commission also 
proposed to include the option of selling the institution or part of the 
institution to one or more purchasers without consent of the shareholders.193  
In order to clean the balance sheet of a troubled bank, the proposal allows 
the transfer of assets either to a temporary “bridge bank” or, in case of 
generally underperforming assets, to a “bad bank”.194 
 
184 DG Working Document, supra note 10, at 87–89. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 87. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 89. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 87. 
192 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 210, 124 Stat. 1376, 1460 (2010). 
193 COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11, at 9–10; see also DG Working Document, 
supra note 10, at 52. 
194 COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11, at 10; see also DG Working Document, supra 
note 10, at 52–55. 
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3.  Revisions of the Capital Requirements Directives 
On July 20, 2011, the European Commission adopted a new proposal 
on capital requirements for financial institutions.195  The proposal will 
replace the current capital requirements directives 2006/48/EC196 and 
2006/49/EC,197 and it marks an important step toward developing a 
comprehensive regime for crisis prevention, bank recovery, and resolution 
in the European Union.  The proposal is also the first legal framework to 
incorporate the third Basel Accord endorsed by the G20 at its summit in 
Seoul in November 2010.198  And, if enacted by the European Parliament 
and the Council, would apply to more than 8000 banks, amounting to 
approximately 53% of global assets.199 
The proposal consists of both a directive200 and a regulation.201  The 
directive regulates access to deposit-taking activities, including sanctions, 
effective corporate governance and provisions preventing the overreliance 
on external credit ratings.202  In addition, the directive also deals with the 
Basel III agreement as it relates to the provisions on capital buffers.203  Of 
particular interest are the measures proposed in the context of management 
risk taking204 and capital buffers.205 
Considering the importance of effective risk control, the Commission 
proposes the establishment of a “risk committee to deal specifically with 
risk issues and prepare management body decisions on risk issues . . . [and 
to] assist the management body in its risk oversight role. . .”206  In addition, 
the Commission believes the establishment of an independent risk 
management function is essential in order to provide all levels of 
management with a complete and more accurate view on risks and possible 
risk exposure.207 
Regarding capital buffers, the Commission proposes a system of dual 
capital buffers in addition to the capital requirements: a capital conservation 
buffer and a countercyclical capital buffer.208  The capital conservation 
 
195 IP/11/915, supra note 8. 
196 Council Directive 2006/48, supra note 167. 
197 Council Directive 2006/49, supra note 167. 
198 See G20 Seoul Summit, supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
199 IP/11/915, supra note 8. 
200 CRD IV Directive, supra note 10. 
201 CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10. 
202 CRD IV Directive, supra note 10, at 2. 
203 Id.  Other changes relating to the third Basel Accord are part of the proposal for a 
regulation. 
204 Id. at 11–12. 
205 Id. at 12–13. 
206 Id. at 11. 
207 Id. at 12 (the proposal refers to “senior management” and “management body”). 
208 Id. 
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buffer is aimed at loss absorbency in a financial crisis and has a target 
amount of 2.5% of risk-weighted assets of the highest quality.209  Financial 
institutions that fall below the buffer target are subject to limitations on 
discretionary distributions of earnings.210 
The additional countercyclical buffer that the Commission 
recommends seeks to protect financial stability and the economy at large by 
limiting the effects of various system-wide risks.211  The countercyclical 
buffer increases the size of the buffer range up to an additional 2.5%.212  
The discretion to set the actual size of the countercyclical buffer is, 
however, left to national authorities and may be set between 0% and 2.5% 
of risk-weighted assets of the highest quality.213  The ceiling of 2.5% is 
flexible, providing national authorities with the power to go beyond 2.5% if 
justified.214  Regardless, if a member state sets the buffer above 2.5%, other 
Member States do have the additional discretion to accept or reject that 
judgment for financial institutions authorized in their own member state.215  
It is also noteworthy that in addition to restrictions on profit distributions, 
institutions whose capital falls below the buffers are subject to limitations 
on payments on Additional Tier 1 instruments,216 bonuses and discretionary 
pension benefits.217 
Under the mutual recognition requirement, all Member States may be 
forced to harmonize the size of their countercyclical buffers Union-wide.  If 
only one Member State, such as Germany, implements sizeable 
countercyclical buffers all other Member States will be forced to accept this 
requirement of up to 2.5% for their own financial institutions as long as 
these institutions are doing business in or maintaining branches and 
subsidiaries in Germany.  Therefore, the financially stronger Member States 
with the largest financial sectors may dictate the size of countercyclical 
buffers for smaller Member States, thereby practically reducing any 
proposed national discretion.  The only relevant area where some national 
discretion may remain is where countercyclical buffers are set above the 
ceiling for mutual recognition or between 2.5% and 5%.  The Commission 
proposal explicitly allows Member States to implement countercyclical 
buffers of up to 5%, but limits mutual recognition to the 2.5% ceiling.  Even 
in these instances, the proposed discretion may be misleading.  For 
 
209 Id.; see also id. art. 123, ¶ 1, at 133. 
210 Id. art. 123, ¶ 1, at 124, ¶ 3, at 133. 
211 Id. art. 123, ¶ 1, at 124, ¶ 3, at 113. 
212 Id. at 12; see also id. art. 126, ¶ 5, at 115. 
213 Id. art. 126, ¶ 1, at 13–14 . 
214 Id. art. 126, ¶¶ 3, 5. 
215 Id; see also id. art. 127, at ¶ 1. 
216 Additional Tier 1 capital is defined in the proposed regulation.  CRD IV Regulation, 
supra note 10, arts. 48–52. 
217 CRD IV Directive, supra note 10, art. 131, at 13. 
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example, if the U.K. intends to set its countercyclical measure at 5% but 
Germany requires no more than 2.5%, it seems unlikely that the Bank of 
England and the British government, long term, would be willing to give 
German banks, a significant competitive advantage over their national 
financial institutions, especially if the British government maintains 
significant ownership in some of these institutions. 
Finally, the Commission suggests a limitation on the use of external 
credit ratings.218  Specifically, the Commission proposes that external credit 
ratings may only be used as one factor and that financial institutions with 
material credit risk exposure or a high number of counterparties should be 
required to develop additional internal rating models rather than only 
relying on external ratings.219 
In addition to the directive, the regulation220 proposed by the 
Commission aims to ensure the effectiveness of institutional capital 
regulation, It aims to protect depositors and to limit possible pro-cyclical 
effects while maintaining competitiveness of the European financial 
markets.221  In order to achieve this goal the regulation not only implements 
the Basel III agreement,222 it also focuses on maximum harmonization with 
the goal of achieving a true “single rule book.”223  The proposal seeks to 
harmonize different national supervisory regimes by almost entirely 
removing any options or discretion.224 
As part of its proposal, the Commission has also adopted225 the Basel 
Committee’s minimum requirements on loss absorbency at the point of 
non-viability.226  Accordingly, “all Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments 
of an institution should be fully and permanently written down or converted 
fully into Common Equity Tier 1 capital at the point of non-viability of the 
institution.”227  In Article 49(1)(n), the proposed regulation defines one 
form of “Additional Tier 1 instruments” as a capital instrument in which 
“the provisions governing the instruments require the principal amount of 
the instruments to be written down, or the instruments to be converted to 
Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, upon the occurrence of a trigger 
 
218 Id. at 12. 
219 Id. 
220 CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10. 
221 Id. at 2. 
222 Id. at 10–15.  See also CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, ¶ 24 & art. 87, at 20. 
223 CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, at 8. 
224 Id. 
225 CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, ¶ 27, at 20. 
226 Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Final Elements of the Reforms to Raise the 
Quality of Regulatory Capital Issued by the Basel Committee (Jan. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.bis.org/press/p110113.htm. 
227 CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, at 20, ¶ 27. 
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event.”228 
Contingent capital is defined as the conversion or write down of a 
financial institution’s debt securities into equity securities upon the 
occurrence of a predefined trigger event.229  As such, contingent capital 
would qualify as an “Additional Tier 1 instrument” under the Commission’s 
proposal.  However, the Commission proposal seems to distinguish between 
different forms of contingent capital and additional Tier 1 instruments by 
defining different write-down and conversion requirements.230  Article 
51(a)(i) sets a statutory default trigger at 5.125% of the common equity tier 
1 ratio.231  While upward exceptions are allowed,232 the proposal also 
stipulates a specific and seemingly separate233 set of conversion and write-
down requirements.234  First, if the instrument requires conversion into a 
common equity tier 1 instrument it is required to specify (a) the rate of 
conversion and the limit on the permitted amount of conversion,235 and (b) a 
range within which the instrument will convert into common equity tier 1 
instruments.236  Second, if the instrument requires the principal amount to 
be written down upon the occurrence of a trigger event, the write-down is 
required to reduce (a) the claim of the holder of the instrument during 
liquidation,237 (b) the amount required to be paid in the event of the call of 
the instrument,238 and (c) the distributions made on the instrument.239 
 
228 Id. at 76. 
229 See discussion supra Part I; see also discussion infra Part IV. 
230 With regard to the distinction by financial institution attempted in Article 51(a), the 
distinction is ambiguous and requires further clarification or amendment.  Specifically, the 
statutory reference in § 51, ¶ (a) (“of the institution referred to in point (a) of Article 87”) is 
unclear and indeterminate. 
231 CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, § 51, ¶ (a)(i). 
232 Id. § 51, ¶ (a)(ii). 
233 Id.  The statutory relationship between the three subsections in Article 51 is also open 
to interpretation.  Article 51(a) seems to establish a statutory write-down tool similar to that 
proposed by the Commission in the DG Internal Market and Service Working Document.  
DG Working Document, supra note 10, at 87.  At the same time, the exception to the default 
trigger event established in Article 51(a)(ii) requires an instrument with a specified trigger 
event included in the instrument, which is defined by the financial institution and necessarily 
must be based on contractual terms.  This merges two concepts of the proposal in the DG 
Working Document the concept of a statutory debt write-down tool with that of a contractual 
write-down tool.  It is unclear from the regulation proposal whether the additional trigger 
event requirements defined in section (b) and (c) are contingent upon the definition in 
section (a)(ii).  In other words, it is unclear whether the requirements of section (b) and (c) 
only apply to “Additional Tier 1 instruments” that set at least a trigger event of 5.125% as a 
minimum requirement or whether these requirements are to be viewed as independent. 
234 CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, § 51, ¶¶ (b) and (c). 
235 Id. § 51, ¶ (b)(i). 
236 Id. § 51, ¶ (b)(ii). 
237 Id. § 51, ¶ (c)(i). 
238 Id. § 51, ¶ (c)(ii). 
239 Id. § 51, ¶ (c)(iii). 
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C.  National Initiatives in Europe 
Many countries in Europe, including non-European Union Member 
States, have actively pursued a reform of national banking and insolvency 
laws.240  Although Switzerland is not a member of the European Union and 
the United Kingdom has not adopted the Euro, the Swiss approach and the 
approach of the United Kingdom to bank reorganization have served as 
examples for the reform of the German Banking Law as well as many 
European Union initiatives. The national initiatives in both countries 
suggest a need for convergence of international and European Union-wide 
bank recovery and resolution regimes.  At the European Union level, there 
is some evidence that many national laws implemented during the crisis, 
including the German Banking Reorganization Act,241 may need to be 
amended in order to meet the EU-wide objective of maximum 
harmonization with the goal of achieving a single-rule book.242 
1.  Bank Reorganization under Swiss Law243 
The Swiss Federal Law on Banks and Savings and Loans244 includes 
specific rules for bank reorganization independent of the Swiss bankruptcy 
code.245  The reorganization procedure is part of the Swiss Supervisory 
Authority’s (FINMA) intervention powers and may only be ordered if 
success is reasonably likely.246  In addition, sufficient evidence of pending 
insolvency, significant liquidity problems, or evidence that the bank is 
unable to meet capital requirements is required for this procedure.247  The 
Supervisory Authority may further appoint a trustee charged with drafting 
the reorganization plan.248  Unless challenged by creditors in court,249 the 
Authority approves and implements the plan without any court 
 
240 See, e.g., Bundesgesetz über die Banken und Sparkassen, [Federal Law on Banks, 
Savings and Loans], BANKENGESETZ [BANKG] Nov. 1934, vol. 8 (Switz.), available at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf; see infra text accompanying note 243. 
241 Id. 
242 CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, at 10. 
243 Bundesgesetz über die Banken und Sparkassen [BANKG] [Federal Law on Banks and 
Savings and Loans] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952 (Switz.), available at http://www.admin.ch/ 
ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf. 
244 Bundesgesetz über die Banken und Sparkassen [BANKG] [Federal Law on Banks and 
Savings and Loans] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952 (Switz.), available at http://www.admin.ch/ 
ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf. 
245 Urs Zulauf, Schweizer Banken Sanierungsrecht – geeignet für systemrelevante 
Banken?, WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN: ZEITSCHRIFT 1525, 1530 (2010) (Ger.). 
246 Bundesgesetz über die Banken und Sparkassen [BANKG] [Federal Law on Banks, 
Savings and Loans] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952, at art. 28 (Switz.), available at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf. 
247 Id. art.25, ¶ 1. 
248 Id. art. 28, ¶ 3. 
249 Id. art. 31a, ¶¶ 2–3. 
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confirmation.250  In addition to the Swiss Supervisory Authority’s central 
role in initiating and overseeing a possible reorganization procedure, the 
Authority may also reduce or avoid claims and may defer or cease any debt 
payments.251  As in the U.S.,252 the principle of “no creditor worse-off than 
in liquidation” applies; the impairment of creditors’ claims is limited to the 
amount of the claim in liquidation.253 
Similar to many European civil law jurisdictions, in Switzerland the 
Swiss Supervisory Authority has a dual role as supervisory and resolution 
authority of financial institutions at the same time.  An administrative 
agency, rather than a bankruptcy court therefore generally oversees 
insolvency proceedings in Switzerland.  The perceived advantage is better 
knowledge of the banking sector that may result in a more efficient and 
expeditious procedure.  The clear disadvantage is the broad discretion of the 
agency in overseeing financial institutions.  Furthermore, under Swiss law 
the investigatory and supervisory role of creditors are limited.  There is no 
mandatory requirement to appoint creditors’ committees.  Finally, Swiss 
law does not provide for an automatic stay or allow the financial institution 
or creditors to challenge any of the measures ordered by the Supervisory 
Authority other then plan approval.254 
The Swiss legislature has enacted and amended the Swiss Bank Act.255  
The latest amendments specifically focus on the creation of a legal basis for 
contingent capital that would allow financial institutions to meet capital 
requirements through the issuance of contingent capital.256 
2.  The British Banking Act of 2009 
The British Banking Act may be the most comprehensive legal 
framework in response to the turmoil of the financial crisis.257  Before 2008, 
the United Kingdom did not have a permanent statutory regime for dealing 
with bank failures.258 It introduced the Banking (Special Provisions) Act of 
 
250 Id. art. 32. 
251 Id. art. 26. 
252 See, e.g., U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(ii) (2006). 
253 Bundesgesetz über die Banken und Sparkassen [BANKG] [Federal Law on Banks, 
Savings and Loans] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952, at art. 31(b) (Switz.), available at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf. 
254 Zulauf, supra note 248, at 1531 (Zulauf argues that in light of the expeditious nature 
of the procedure creditors are provided with too many rights). 
255 See infra Part IV.C. 
256 Id. 
257 See, e.g., Paul Anning & Matthias Terlau, Maßnahmen gegen die Finanzmarktkrise – 
Großbritannien [Measures to tackle the financial crisis—UK], 55 Recht der Internationalen 
Wirtschaft 54 (2009) (Ger.); Höche, supra note 7, at 51. 
258 See Banking Act, 2009, c.1, Explanatory Notes, ¶ 7 (U.K.), available at http://www. 
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/1/notes. 
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2008 in response to the Northern Rock failure.259  The Banking (Special 
Provisions) Act of 2008, however, only provided a temporary regime 
allowing the Treasury to facilitate an orderly resolution of banks and 
maintain financial stability.260  The Banking (Special Provisions) Act of 
2008 lapsed on February 20, 2009,261 and was replaced by the Banking Act 
2009.262 
The Banking Act 2009 (the Act) established a permanent special 
resolution regime (SRR) providing the authorities in the United Kingdom 
with the necessary tools to deal with banks in financial distress.263  The Act 
provides for three distinct options under SRR: (1) a stabilization procedure 
focusing on asset transfer;264 (2) a new bank insolvency procedure265 
focusing on orderly wind-down and liquidation;266 and (3) a new bank 
administration procedure.267  The decision to exercise a procedure under the 
SRR requires participation of the Tripartite Authorities: the HM Treasury, 
the Bank of England, and the Financial Services Authority (FSA).268  The 
Tripartite Authorities coordinate, cooperate, and share information at each 
stage of the decision making process.269 
Before choosing among the different resolution tools, the Bank of 
England must conduct a benefits analysis and consider the relative 
 
259 Banking (Special Provisions) Act, 2008, c. 2 (U.K.), available at http://www.legis 
lation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/2/pdfs/ukpga_20080002en.pdf. 
260 See, e.g., Banking Act 2009 (Commencement No. 1) Order, 2009, c.14, Explanatory 
Note (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/296/note/made; see also 
Banking Act, 2009, c. 1, § 262 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
2009/1/section/262. 
261 Banking Act, 2009, c. 1, §§ 262–64 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation. 
gov.uk/ukpga/2009/1/pdfs/ukpga_20090001_en.pdf. 
262 Banking Act, 2009, c. 1 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
2009/1/pdfs/ukpga_20090001_en.pdf.  See also Banking Act 2009 (Commencement No. 3) 
Order, 2009, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/2038/contents/made; 
Banking Act 2009 (Commencement No. 4) Order, 2009, available at http://www.legislation. 
gov.uk/uksi/2009/3000/contents/made. 
263 Banking Act, 2009, c.1, §4 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
2009/1/section/4. 
264 The stabilization procedures offers three different options, all of which focus on asset 
transfer: (1) transfer to a private sector purchaser, (2) transfer to a bridge bank, and (3) 
transfer to temporary public ownership. 
265 Banking Act, 2009, c. 1, §§ 90–135 (U.K.). 
266 Id. § 96. 
267 Id. §§ 136–68. 
268 The tripartite structure of the Supervisory Authorities of the U.K. financial system 
bears clear resemblance to the so-called “three key turn” under Dodd-Frank, see, e.g., SKEEL, 
supra note 1, at 130. 
269 See, e.g., HM Treasury, Banking Act 2009 Special Resolution Regime: Code of 
Practice, at 11, available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/bankingact2009_code_of_ 
practice. pdf. 
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advantage of the stabilization option over insolvency and wind-down.270  
The stabilization procedure may only be initiated after the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) determines that three conditions are met.271  First, 
the FSA must conclude that the institution is failing or unlikely to satisfy 
certain threshold conditions.272  Second, the FSA must find that it is not 
reasonably likely that the bank will take or be able to take any action to 
meet the threshold conditions.273  Third, the FSA must also decide that there 
is no realistic prospect that the bank will operate as an authorized deposit 
taker.274  In addition to the aforementioned conditions, the Bank of England 
is required to establish that the stabilization procedure is necessary to 
protect the stability of the financial system of the United Kingdom, to 
ensure public confidence in the stability of the system, and to protect 
depositors.275 
Stabilization may be the best option when transfers to a private sector 
purchaser, to a bridge bank, or temporary public ownership seem more cost 
effective or any such transfers would provide a better platform and starting 
point for reorganization.276  However, insolvency may be the best option if 
contagion is a real threat and liquidation would affect overall system 
stability as well as creditors’ and depositors’ confidence.  The factors in 
favor of exercising the insolvency procedure include, for example, 
considerations of whether a wind down would be fair and equitable or 
whether it would be in the public interest.277  The new bank administration 
procedure is a procedure that specifically deals with the wind down of the 
insolvent residual bank that remains after a partial asset transfer to a bridge 
bank or private sector purchaser was executed.278 
Although the Act does not explicitly refer to contingent capital, debt-
equity swaps or write-down tools, the Act does allow the use of company 
voluntary arrangements,279 which may fulfill the very same purpose as any 
traditional debt-equity swap in bankruptcy.280  In addition, one bank in the 
 
270 Id. at 15, ¶ 5.18. 
271 Banking Act, 2009, c.1, §7 (U.K.). 




275 Id. § 8. 
276 Id. ¶¶ 5.19–5.22. 
277 Banking Act, 2009, c. 1, §96 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov. 
uk/ukpga/2009/1/section/262. 
278 Id. ¶¶ 7.5–7.8, at 29.  The administrative procedure is based on the administrative 
procedure under Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
279 Id. § 113. 
280 Id. § 154; see also Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 1(1) (U.K.) (“The directors of a 
company . . . may make a proposal under this Part to the company and to its creditors for a 
composition in satisfaction of its debts or a scheme of arrangement of its affairs (from here 
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U.K., the Lloyd’s Banking Group281 has already issued contingent capital 
and a second, Barclays282 is attempting to do the same.  The Lloyd’s 
Banking Group issued its contingent convertibles as enhanced capital notes, 
which are classified under Basel II as subordinate debt or lower tier-2 
capital,283 and do not require any additional regulatory validation.  
Furthermore, the U.K. is currently also considering additional banking law 
reform, which specifically centers on making the U.K. banking system 
more stable and more competitive.284  Contingent capital may be used as a 
supplementary measure to create effective loss-absorbing debt.285 
3.  The German Banking Reorganization Act of 2010 
Late in 2011, Germany followed other European countries and enacted 
its own bank reorganization law.286  The law includes three main sections 
addressed in this article: (1) the Financial Institution Reorganization Act 
(Kreditinstitute-Reorganisationsgesetz),287 (2) the Amendment to the 
German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz),288 and (3) the Law Establishing 
the Reorganization Fund for Financial Institutions  
(Restrukturierungsfondsgesetz).289 
Most noteworthy, the law creates a two-tiered approach to bank 
reorganization.  The first tier focuses on voluntary reorganization 
procedures solely initiated by the financial institutions prior to or outside of 
 
on referred to, in either case, as a ‘voluntary arrangement’).”). 
281 JACKIE INEKE ET AL., MORGAN STANLEY RES., INVESTMENT GRADE CREDIT: EUROPEAN 
BANKS 25 (2011). 
282 Patrick Jenkins, Barclays Set to Follow Swiss Lead, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2011), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7f3c49ea-386e-11e0-959c00144feabdc0.html#axzz1 
THW9e9vY.  See also infra, note 517 and accompanying text. 
283 George M. Furstenberg, Contingent Capital to Strengthen the Private Safety Net for 
Financial Institutions: Cocos to the Rescue 10 (Deutsche Bundesbank, Discussion Paper 
Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies No. 01/2011, 2011), available at 
http://www.bundesbank.de/download/bankenaufsicht/dkp/201101dkp_b_.pdf. 
284 INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT CONSULTATION ON REFORM 
OPTIONS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2011). 
285 Id. at 7. 
286 Gesetz zur Restrukturierung und geordneten Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten, zur 
Errichtung eines Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute und zur Verlängerung der 
Verjährungsfrist der aktienrechtlichen Organhaftung [RStruktG] [German Banking 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL I at 1900. 
287 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900 (Ger.) [hereinafter 
[KredReorgG][Financial Institution Reorganization Act]]. 
288 Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Titel I [BGBL. I] at 2776 [hereinafter [KWG] [German Banking 
Act]]. 
289 Gesetz zur Einrichtung eines Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute [RStrukFG] 
[Law Establishing the Restructuring Fund for Financial Institutions], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I 
at 1900 (Ger.). 
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any formal insolvency proceeding.  The second tier allows for increased 
early regulatory intervention by the Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority (BaFin),290 including asset transfer.291  Analogous to the 
European Union Commission proposal,292 the German law follows an early 
intervention strategy and attempts to address the issue of “too big to fail” or 
“too interconnected to fail.” As in the United States, the possibility of 
insolvency proved to be an insufficient threat for financial institutions 
during the height of the financial crisis in Germany.  Financial institutions 
in Germany relied on state aid to be bailed out.  The reliance on a public 
bail-out without the threat of any significant losses shared by management, 
shareholders and creditors may have created an asymmetric incentive for 
excessive risk taking by financial institutions.293  The German law tries to 
address this failure by making market exit without state aid for financial 
institutions a credible and not merely a theoretical option. 
(a)  The German Financial Institution Reorganization Act 
The Financial Institution Reorganization Act (Kreditinstituten-
Reorganisationsgesetz)294 establishes a reorganization procedure 
specifically aimed at financial institutions in Germany.  This procedure is 
different from a formal insolvency procedure under German law.  This is of 
particular importance because the German Insolvency Act (German 
Bankruptcy Code)295 until recently continued to be primarily associated 
with liquidation as the only option for insolvent businesses and 
corporations.296 
Unlike the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the German Insolvency Act does 
 
290 Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht [BaFin]; see 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz [FinDAG] [Act Establishing the Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority], Apr. 22, 2002, BGBL. I at 1310 (Ger.). 
291 Gesetz zur Restrukturierung und geordneten Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten, zur 
Errichtung eines Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute und zur Verlängerung der 
Verjährungsfrist der aktienrechtlichen Organhaftung [RStruktG] [German Banking 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL I at 1900.  (The German Banking Reorganization 
Act includes two additional sections that are noteworthy.  The first section qualifies the 
powers of the Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilization (“Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzmarktstabilisierung (FSMA)”).  The second amends the statute of limitations for the 
liability of board members of public limited companies for wrongful acts or negligence.) 
292 See supra Part III.B.2., note 163 and accompanying text. 
293 Coffee, supra note 26, at 798–99; see Charles W. Calomiris & Richard J. Herring, 
Why and How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement 1 (Apr. 19, 2011) 
(Working Paper, on file Univ. of Pa.), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1815406. 
294 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900 (Ger.). 
295 Insolvenzordnung [InsO] [German Insolvency Act], Oct. 5, 1994, BGBL. I at 2866. 
296 Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 221; Lars Westpfahl, Vorinsolvenzliches 
Sanierungsverfahren, 2010 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS – UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 
[ZGR] 385, 392 (Ger.). 
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not clearly distinguish between Chapter 7 liquidation and Chapter 11 
reorganization procedures.  As a result, the German law traditionally stands 
much closer to the original meaning of bankruptcy, implying the idea of 
liquidating the debtor’s present assets and distributing these assets among 
creditors on an equitable basis.297  In addition, the German regulatory 
intervention regime for financial institutions did not allow for any 
procedure that would have reliably permitted operating a bank as a going 
concern during the financial crisis.  One of the few tools available was a so-
called moratorium to restrict deposits and withdrawals or to temporarily 
close the bank for business.298  It is unlikely that any one person or investor 
would conduct business with a financial institution limited in that 
manner.299 
The German Financial Institution Reorganization Act entered into 
force on January 1, 2011, and is in part modeled after the Swiss Law and 
the UK Banking Act of 2008 and 2009.300  However, some similarities to 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code can also be observed. 
The German law emphasizes a voluntary reorganization petition filed 
by the financial institution in distress with the Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 
(BaFin)).301  The law further distinguishes between two independent 
procedures, the stabilization procedure (Sanierungsverfahren) and the 
reorganization procedure (Reorganisationsverfahren).302 
 
297 In Germany, the opinion that a financial institution cannot be reorganized after 
petitioning for bankruptcy protection persists.  See Westpfahl, supra note 300, at 392; 
Reinhard Bork, Grundfragen des Restrukturierungsrechts – Prologue zu einer Reform des 
deutschen Insolvenzrechts, 2010 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT UND 
INSOLVENZPRAXIS [ZIP] 397.  See also Heribert Hirte, Bela Knopf & Sebastian Mock, Das 
Gesetz zur Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen (Teil I), 2011 Der Betrieb [DB], 
632 (arguing that with the new reform of the German Insolvency Act, taking effect on March 
1, 2012, the German legislature has now substantially increased creditors’ autonomy by 
introducing a broader business reorganization procedure).  On the U.S. view, see SKEEL, 
supra note 1.  For a discussion of the original meaning of bankruptcy, see CHARLES JORDAN 
TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1039 (2d ed. 2009). 
298 See Gesetz über das Kreditwesen (Kreditwesengesetz) [KWG] [German Banking Act] 
Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I at 2776, as amended, § 47; see also Schuster & Westpfahl, supra 
note 2, at 392; Bork, supra note 297, at 406. 
299 See Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 221; see also Gregor Bachmann, Das neue 
Restrukturierungsrecht der Kreditinstitute, 2010 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR BANKRECHT UND 
BANKWIRTSCHAFT [ZBB] 459 (Ger.); Jens-Hinrich Binder, Institutionalisierte 
Krisenbewältigung bei Kreditinstituten, 2009 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR BANKRECHT UND 
BANKWIRTSCHAFT [ZBB] 19, 21 (Ger.). 
300 See discussion supra Part III.C.1. and III.A.2. 
301 See Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten (Kreditinstitute-
Reorganizationsgesetz) [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution Reorganization Act] Dec. 9, 
2010, BGBL. I, at 1900; see also supra text accompanying note 294. 
302 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, §1(1) (Ger.). 
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(i)  Stabilization Procedure 
The stabilization procedure (Sanierungsverfahren)303 does not allow 
for a discharge of prior claims, the impairment of creditors’ rights, or any 
encroachment of third party rights without party consent.304  However, the 
stabilization procedure permits the issuance of new shares, debt conversion, 
and debt rescheduling or debt subordination.  The focus of the procedure is 
the voluntary participation of all creditor groups interested in recapitalizing 
the financial institution.  Unlike the British stabilization procedure under 
the Banking Act 2009, the German stabilization procedure does not permit 
asset transfers at this stage and is controlled by the debtor.  The main 
advantage of the stabilization procedure is the possibility for new lenders to 
receive a priming lien or super-priority for loans.305  Super-priority is 
extended for the duration of three years and effective only in case of the 
commencement of liquidation proceedings during that period.306  However, 
the total volume of all loans qualifying for super-priority during the 
stabilization procedure is limited to 10% of the bank’s own funds.307 
Any financial institution in Germany308 may initiate a stabilization 
procedure by voluntary petition.309  The financial institution must notify the 
Federal Supervisory Authority of its existing financial distress and need for 
reorganization.  Along with the petition, the institution must submit a 
detailed stabilization plan and nominate a trustee (Sanierungsberater).310 
 
303 Id. § 2. 
304 Id. § 2(2). 
305 Id.  This is clearly very similar to U.S. Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. § 364(d), which 
permits the debtor in possession, after court approval, to incur debt “secured by a senior or 
equal lien on property of the estate that is subject to a lien.”  Note, however, if the financial 
institution files for bankruptcy within 3 years of the stabilization procedure, subordinated 
creditors may challenge the super-priority by claiming that the petitioner did not meet the 
conditions for the stabilization procedure and that the loan volume did not comply with the 
legal requirements.  See § 3(2).  One is further reminded of the absolute priority rule under 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8).  See, e.g., David A. Skeel, The Nature and 
Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 484 
(1992). 
306 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 2(2) (Ger.). 
307 Id. 
308 Gesetz über das Kreditwesen (Kreditwesengesetz) [KWG] [German Banking Act] 
Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I at 2776, as amended, § 1(1).  In Germany, financial institutions are 
required to maintain their headquarters in the country in which they are registered.  Id. § 
33(6); see also art. 11, ¶ 2a; Council Directive 2006/48, supra note 167, art. 17. 
309 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 2(1), (Ger.). 
310 Id. §2(2).  Please note, the translation of “Sanierungsberater” as trustee is not a literal 
translation.  Instead, the literal translation as “advisor” appears somewhat misleading in the 
U.S. context.  Both the “Sanierungsberater” and the “Reorganisationsberater” display 
powers and functions similar to a trustee under U.S. bankruptcy law.  It is important to note, 
however, that a trustee under the U.S. Bankruptcy Law also has some additional and more 
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Upon petition, the Authority reviews the petition, the proposed plan, 
and the qualifications of the nominated trustee.  If all requirements are 
satisfied and no additional amendments to the plan are made, the Authority 
moves to petition311 the competent court for approval of the reorganization 
under the stabilization procedure and requests the confirmation of the 
reorganization plan.312  The court reviews the petition and the proposed 
plan independently for a second time.313  If satisfied, the court confirms the 
plan and orders the appointment of the trustee.314  Like the concept of a 
debtor in possession (DIP) under U.S. law,315 the trustee may be a member 
of the board or other person directly associated with the financial institution 
petitioning for reorganization.316  The main duty of the trustee is to 
supervise and implement the reorganization plan. The trustee may also act 
as an advisor to the troubled financial institution itself and directly 
participate in the corporate governance of the institution.317 
Unlike U.S. law, the court’s confirmation of the plan does not 
complete the reorganization under the stabilization procedure.  Instead, the 
successful implementation of the stabilization plan is a prerequisite.318  
During the implementation phase, the trustee continuously reports to the 
Federal Supervisory Authority and the court319 and must provide detailed 
updates on the status of the implementation of the plan.320 The court may 
further order additional measures if it deems them necessary and depending 
 
far-reaching powers when compared to those of the “Sanierungsberater” and 
“Reorganisationsberater” under German law. 
311 Id. § 2(3). 
312 The competent court is the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht or OLG) in 
Frankfurt/Main.  See Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz [FinDAG] [Act Establishing the 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority], Apr. 22, 2002, BGBL. I at 1310, § 1(3). 
313 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 3(1) (Ger.) 
314 Id. § 3(1).  A court hearing is not required with the exception of cases in which the 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority determined that the trustee nominated by the 
financial institution is not qualified.  See § 2(3); see also § 1(3); § 1(2) (in conjunction with 
Zivilprozeßordnung [ZPO] [Federal Code of Civil Procedure], Dec. 5, 2005, as amended, 
§128, para. 4 (Ger.)); Gesetzentwurf Sept. 27, 2010, BT 17/3024, at 44 (Ger.). 
315 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1107 (2006). 
316 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 3(3) (Ger.).  In addition, the court 
may order the trustee to participate in the management of all business aspects of the financial 
institution during the level 1 reorganization procedure.  See id. §5(1), no. 2.  If the trustee is 
a member of the board or associated with the financial institution, the Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority may, however, petition the OLG Frankfurt to replace him.  Good 
cause is not required for replacement.  Id. § 3(3). 
317 Id. § 6(1). 
318 Id. § 6(3). 
319 Id. §§ 4(2), 6(2). 
320 Id. 
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on the progress of plan implementation.321  Specifically, the court can 
prohibit or restrict any activities of current executive officers or members of 
management, including present ownership.322  The court may also appoint 
the trustee as an active member of management who participates in 
corporate governance during the reorganization.323  It can restrict or prohibit 
withdrawals and the distribution of profits,324 review existing remuneration 
and bonus agreements, and prohibit any payment for services not due.325  
Most importantly, the court can pre-empt any required approval of the 
corporate supervisory board in the context of the reorganization.326 
To complete the reorganization of any financial institution under the 
stabilization procedure, the trustee is required to notify the Federal 
Financial Supervisory Authority first.327  Following this notice, the trustee 
may notify the court of the completion, which then formally orders the 
conclusion of the procedure.328  If the stabilization procedure did not return 
the financial institution to solvency and has proved unsuccessful, the 
financial institution may be liquidated or may petition for protection under 
the reorganization procedure, which is the second independent 
reorganization procedure under German law.329 
  
 
321 Id. § 5. 
322 Id. § 5(1), no. 1. 
323 Id. § 5(1), no. 2. 
324 Id. § 5(1), no. 3. 
325 Id. § 5(1), no. 4. 
326 Id. § 5(1), no. 5. 
327 Id. § 6(3). 
328 Id. 
329 Id. §§ 6(3), 7. 




(ii)  Reorganization Procedure 
The reorganization procedure (Reorganisationsverfahren) is only 
available to systemically important financial institutions.330  All other 
financial institutions must be liquidated or are limited to petition for 
protection under the stabilization procedure.331  Given the threat of failure 
of a systemically relevant bank, the main focus of the reorganization 
procedure is the systemic relevance of any financial institution in distress 
and the avoidance of any possible threat of contagion to the entire financial 
system in Germany.  Under German Law, systemically relevant banks have 
two options for reorganization.  The banks may either reorganize under the 
 
330 Id. § 7(2); see also Yvonne Stengel, Das Kreditinstitute-Reorganisationsgesetz: 
Rechtliche Aspekte der zukünftigen Sanierung und Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten, DER 
BETRIEB, Supp. 4, 2011, at 11, 12; Karsten Müller-Eising et al., Das Banken-
Restrukturierungsgesetz, BETRIEBS-BERATER, Jan. 10, 2011, at 66, 70; Höche, supra note7, 
at 54; Manfred Obermüller, Das Bankenrestrukturierungsgesetz – Ein kurzer Überblick über 
ein langes Gesetz, 3 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INSOLVENZRECHT 81, 88 (2011).  Please note the 
term ”systemically relevant” may be used interchangably with the term “systemically 
important.” 
331 [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution Reorganization Act] § 3(3); see supra text 
accompanying note 333. 
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stabilization procedure or the reorganization procedure.  The stabilization 
procedure is not required as a precondition for the reorganization procedure.  
Instead, if the systemically relevant bank is convinced that reorganization 
under the stabilization procedure is not an option, the bank may instead 
immediately petition the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority 
(BaFin) for protection under the reorganization procedure.332  In terms of 
systemically important financial institutions the voluntary reorganization 
procedure has one specific shortcoming.  Unlike the involuntary 
reorganization procedure initiated by the Supervisory Authority under the 
German Banking Act,333 groups of financial institutions, financial holding 
groups, or conglomerates are not eligible to petition for protection under the 
voluntary reorganization procedure.334  Financial institutions in group 
structures and holdings will qualify as systemically important institutions.  
In case of failure, these entities may also pose the highest risk to the 
stability of the financial markets. 
The German reorganization procedure is similar to the stabilization 
procedure. It is independent of the German Insolvency Act,335 while at the 
same time exhibiting similar aspects.336  The procedure also compares to 
Chapter 11 under U.S. Bankruptcy Law337 and the Arrangement Procedure 
under British Law.338  For example, claims must be filed and validated.339  
Claims may be impaired, reduced, avoided, or deferred, and debt can be 
restructured without each individual creditor’s consent.340  Nevertheless, 
employees’ income, retirement claims, and certain secured interests341 are 
exempt and protected.342  In that sense, the reorganization procedure for 
 
332 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 7(1) (Ger.). 
333 Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I 
at 2776. 
334 Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note2, at 282–83. 
335 See KredReorgG [Financial Institution Reorganization Act]; see Insolvenzordnung 
[InsO] [German Insolvency Statute] Oct. 5, 1994, BGBl. I 2866; see Schuster & Westpfahl, 
supra note 2, at 221; see Lars Westpfahl, Vorinsolvenzliches Sanierungsverfahren, 2010 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS – UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 385, 392 (Ger.). 
336 See Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 225. 
337 See, e.g., U.S. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2006) (the concept of a debtor in 
possession (DIP) is exhibited in the German provisions of the Gesetz zur Reorganisation von 
Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, 
BGBL. I at 1900, § 3(3) (Ger.), which in resemblance of a DIP permits that the appointed 
trustee (“Sanierungsberater”) may be a member of the distressed bank). 
338 Banking Act, 2009, c.1, §§ 113, 154 (U.K.). 
339 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 14 (Ger.). 
340 Id. at §12. 
341 Id.  Creditor claims protected by any voluntary or statutory deposit insurance cannot 
be impaired (“Einlagensicherungsfonds”). 
342 Id.  One intention for the protection of employees’ and other rights was the desire to 
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financial institutions under German Law provides many aspects of 
bankruptcy protection at a pre-insolvency stage.  Generally, the impairment 
of creditors’ rights is permitted without consent.343  But most important, the 
reorganization plan may permanently impair shareholders’ rights.344  Assets 
may be sold or temporarily transferred,345 equity may be increased while 
pre-emptive rights of shareholders are excluded from any increase,346 and 
debt may be converted into equity (debt-equity swap).347  The conversion of 
debt into equity does, however, always require explicit creditor consent.348 
In addition, the German law includes a potentially controversial 
provision, allowing appropriate compensation of shareholders in case of 
impairment.349  While a court-appointed expert determines the amount of 
compensation,350 this procedure may run counter to the motives of the 
law.351  Time is of the essence in any bank reorganization and the 
appointment of an expert may significantly slow down the procedure, 
making it less effective.  Waiting for court approval may take time as will 
the analysis of shareholders’ claims by the expert.  This is even more 
important as it is doubtful that creditors, at any time, may receive more than 
the value of their claims.  Moreover, the impairment of shareholder rights 
generally seems appropriate when creditors’ rights are also written down or 
 
avoid class-action suits.  Whether or not this will be successful seems questionable, 
specifically knowing that any systemically relevant financial institution may have a vast 
number of creditors who are neither members of a protected class or may have any protected 
claims. See Schuster &Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 227. 
343 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 8(3) (Ger.). 
344 Id. at §§ 9–11. 
345 Id. § 11(1).  See also Aktiengesetz [AktG][German Company Law], Sept. 6, 1965, 
BGBL. I at 1089, § 179(Ger.). 
346 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 9(1) (Ger.). 
347 Id. 
348 Id.  Creditors’ consent may not be replaced by majority vote of its class in the 
creditors’ committee.  Cramdown is not permitted.  Furthermore, the limit on hold-out in § 
19(1) does not apply.  Regardless, it is debatable whether consent may be replaced if the debt 
instrument includes provisions permitting decision-making by majority vote in accordance 
with the Gesetz über Schuldverschreibungen aus Gesamtemissionen [SchVG] [Law on the 
Issuance of Debentures], July 31, 2009, BGBL. I at 2512, § 5(3), No. 5, as amended (Ger.).  
The majority vote under SchVG, § 5(4), does require a qualified vote of 75% of creditors 
entitled to vote, which goes beyond the simple majority vote required under KredReorgG, 
19(1).  Id.  At the same time, while SchVG, §19 refers to the German Bankruptcy Code in 
case of insolvency, SchVG does not include any reference to the KredReorgG.  See also 
Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 227 (arguing in favor of filling the described gap 
through contract law and private ordering). 
349 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL.I at 1900, § 9(2) (Ger.). 
350 Id. 
351 Id.; see also Obermüller & Kuder, supra note 297, at 2019. 
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otherwise impaired.352 
Like the stabilization procedure, the reorganization procedure also 
requires a voluntary petition.353  The financial institution must petition the 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority,354 submit a reorganization plan, 
and nominate a trustee (Reorganisationsberater).355  After being notified, 
the Supervisory Authority must review the petition.  The Authority has the 
discretion to submit the petition to the competent court after it determines 
that the existence of the financial institution is in danger, and that failure 
carries the risk of contagion and endangers the stability of the entire 
financial system.356 
Under the German Banking Act,357 a bank is deemed to be in danger of 
failure if the financial institution’s own funds,358 core capital,359 or modified 
available funds or liquidity360 have fallen below 90% of the required 
thresholds361 or if there is reason to believe that failure to comply with the 
required thresholds is imminent.362 The German Banking Act provides five 
non-exhaustive examples for determining the risk of contagion and 
systemic threat.363  The Financial Supervisory Authority may consider: (1) 
 
352 See, e.g., Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der 
Sanierung von Unternehmen [ESUG] [Draft Legislation of the German Government, Law to 
Simplify the Reorganization of Corportions], Feb. 23, 2011, § 245(3), No. 1, available at 
http://www.bmj.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/pdfs/RegE_ESUG_23022011.pdf?__blob=p
ublicationFile. 
353 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 7 (Ger.). 
354 Id. § 7(1). 
355 Id. § 7(5). 
356 Id. § 7(2). 
357 Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I 
at 2776. 
358 Id. § 48b(1), no. 1 (“Going-concern risk shall be presumed to exist if (1) the available 
tier 1 capital represents less than 90 per cent of the tier 1 capital required pursuant to section 
10(1) . . .”). 
359 Id. § 48b(1), no. 2 (“Going-concern risk shall be presumed to exist if. . .(2) the 
modified available capital represents less than 90 per cent of the own funds required 
pursuant to section 10(1) . . .”). 
360 Id. § 48b(1), no. 3 (“Going-concern risk shall be presumed to exist if. . .(3) the liquid 
assets available to the institution in a maturity band defined by the statutory order pursuant 
to section 11(1) and sentence 2 represent less than 90 per cent of the payment obligations 
that are callable in the same maturity band, or . . .”). 
361 Id. § 48b(1), nos. 1–3. 
362 Id. § 48b(1), no. 4 (“Going-concern risk shall be presumed to exist if. . .(4) the facts 
are known which warrant the assumption that a shortfall pursuant to numbers 1, 2 and 3 will 
occur if no corrective measures are taken; this is the case, in particular if a loss may be 
anticipated based on the institution’s earnings situation, as a result of which the conditions of 
numbers 1, 2, or 3 would be met.”). 
363 Id. § 48b(2) (“Systemic risk shall be deemed to exist if there is concern that the credit 
institution’s going-concern risk could have a significantly negative impact on other financial 
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the nature and amount of the bank’s liabilities toward other financial 
institutions,364 (2) the amount of deposits,365 (3) the nature, amount and risk 
composition assumed by the bank while taking current and relevant market 
conditions into consideration,366 (4) the bilateral netting of the bank,367 and 
(5) the financial market conditions and possible consequences of any failure 
for other financial institutions, the financial market, and the confidence in 
the stability of the financial markets by depositors and other market 
participants.368 
Given this weighting, the German Banking Act seems to primarily 
consider the violation of regulatory requirements for the determination of 
system relevance and contagion but does not necessarily emphasize 
insolvency.  This is very similar to the stabilization procedure under the 
SRR of the British Banking Act of 2009.  Of further importance is the 
German focus on market reception and confidence in the viability of a 
financial institution.369  The German law does not stipulate any threshold 
conditions or determining factors for market reception or confidence.  As a 
result, it will always be difficult to determine any of these factors in a 
reliable and objective manner.  In addition, while the Supervisory Authority 
has broad discretion to determine the merit of a petition under the 
reorganization procedure,370 it is unclear371 whether the Supervisory 
Authority will have the sole discretion to determine a threat or whether it 
will have to consult the German Central Bank.372  In this context, while the 
German legislature was influenced by the British Banking Act of 2009, it 
did not develop a similar system of tripartite supervisory authorities or a 
system similar to the “three key turns” under Dodd-Frank.373 
 
sector enterprises, on the financial markets or on the general confidence of depositors and 
other market participants in the proper functioning of the financial system. Particular account 
shall be taken of: (1) the nature and scope of the credit institution’s liabilities to other 
institutions and other financial sector enterprises, (2) the volume of the deposits received by 
the institution, (3) the nature, scope and composition of the risks entered into by the 
institution as well as the conditions on the markets on which such positions are traded, (4) 
interconnectedness with other financial market participants, (5) the conditions on the 
financial markets, in particular the consequences which market participants expect the 
institution’s collapse to have on other financial sector enterprises, on the financial market 
and on the confidence of depositors and market participants in the proper functioning of the 
financial market.”). 
364 Id. § 48b(2), no. 1. 
365 Id. § 48b(2), no. 2. 
366 Id. § 48b(2), no. 3. 
367 Id. § 48b(2), no. 4. 
368 Id. § 48b(2), no. 5. 
369 Id. 
370 See Gesetzentwurf Sept. 27, 2010, BT 17/3024 (Ger.). 
371 Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 225. 
372 Id. 
373 See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 1, at 130 (explaining the concept of the “Three key turn” 
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If the Financial Supervisory Authority determines that the 
requirements for the reorganization procedure are fulfilled, it submits the 
petition to the competent court.374  The court must consider whether the 
requirements of the procedure have been met, including the formal 
requirements of the reorganization plan, such as the establishment of the 
creditors’ committees and their voting rights.375  After a hearing in which 
the Supervisory Authority, the German Central Bank, and the petitioning 
financial institution are heard, the court may issue a declaratory order 
establishing that the petitioning bank is in danger of failing with a risk of 
contagion.  Simultaneously the court may also order the immediate 
reorganization and appoint the trustee (Reorganisationsberater).376  All 
court orders are sealed and the hearings are conducted in private.377  In 
addition, the court may stay termination rights of all obligations and 
contracts, such as derivatives, swaps or repurchasing agreements.  The stay 
starts on the date of the initial petition to the Financial Supervisory 
Authority and terminates at the end of the next business day following that 
petition date.378  Assuming the petition was filed on a Friday, termination 
rights and close-out-netting may be stayed for up to 96 hours.379 
The reorganization plan is comparable to a Chapter 11 plan, but yet 
 
as part of the basic framework of bail-out under the Dodd-Frank Act); but see Gesetz über 
das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I at 2776, §§ 8–8e. 
374 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 7(5) (Ger.) (“Soweit für das 
Reorganisationsverfahren nichts anderes bestimmt ist, gelten die Vorschriften über das 
Sanierungsverfahren entsprechend. § 46d Absatz 1 bis 4 des Kreditwesengesetzes gilt 
entsprechend. Für Kreditinstitute, die in anderer Rechtsform als einer Aktiengesellschaft 
verfasst sind, gelten die folgenden Vorschriften sinngemäß.”). 
375 Id. § 7(1), (5). 
376 The trustee, in analogy to the stabilization procedure, may be installed as a member of 
the management of the failing financial institution.  At the same time, part of the trustee’s 
role is to work toward and help in the acceptance of the reorganization plan.  This establishes 
a hybrid role of the trustee that is very similar to the debtor in possession (DIP) under U.S. 
Bankruptcy Law.  While this has been very successful in the United States, many in Europe 
continue to fear a conflict of interest.  See, e.g., Frank Frind, Unabhängigkeit – Kein Wert 
Mehr an Sich? - Die Auswahl und Berufliche Stellung des Insolvenzverwalters Nach den 
Neuen Regelungsentwürfen zur Änderung der InsO, NZI 705 (2010). 
377 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 22(3) (Ger.). 
378 Id. § 13. 
379 Id.  (“Schuldverhältnisse mit dem Kreditinstitut können ab dem Tag der Anzeige nach 
§ 7 Absatz 1 bis zum Ablauf des folgenden Geschäftstages im Sinne des § 1 Absatz 16b des 
Kreditwesengesetzes nicht beendet werden.  Eine Kündigung gegenüber dem Kreditinstitut 
ist in diesem Zeitraum ausgeschlossen. Die Wirkung sonstiger in diesem Zeitraum 
eintretender Beendigungstatbestände ist bis zu seinem Ablauf aufgeschoben.  Abweichende 
Vereinbarungen sind unwirksam . . .”).  Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German 
Banking Act] Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I at 2776, 16(b) (“Der Geschäftstag eines Systems 
umfasst Tag und Nachtabrechnungen und beinhaltet alle Ereignisse innerhalb des üblichen 
Geschäftszyklus eines Systems.”). 
Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring 
32:191 (2012) 
233 
different.  The trustee verifies creditors’ claims, but he also directly contacts 
the creditors informing them of their rights.  The plan requires the 
establishment of a creditor committee consisting of various creditor classes.  
Generally, the plan is drawn up by the creditors and may include the 
transfer of assets or even the liquidation of the bank. 
Plan approval requires a simple majority of all creditors in each class 
and a majority exceeding 50% of the sum of the claims in each class.380  If a 
class of creditors objects to the plan, the objecting class can be crammed 
down.  However, cramdown is only possible if the majority of all other 
classes have approved the plan.  Regardless of cram down, the objecting 
class is allowed an adequate share in the distribution of the plan,381 where 
the principle of “no creditor worse-off than in liquidation” applies.382 
As a separate class, shareholders are also required to approve the 
plan.383  The trustee convenes an extraordinary shareholder meeting during 
which the plan is approved.384  Shareholder approval requires a simple 
majority vote of the attending shareholders if no pre-emptive rights or 
equity positions are impaired by the plan.385  If the latter is the case, either a 
two-thirds majority of the attending shareholders or a simple majority of the 
shareholders representing 50% of the share capital is required.386  Should 
shareholders reject the plan a cramdown option is also available.387  
Shareholder approval is assumed if the majority of all classes of creditors 
approved the plan.388 
Once approved by the creditor committee, the court confirms the plan 
and concludes the reorganization procedure.389  This is similar to the 
Chapter 11 reorganization procedure390 but unlike the stabilization 
procedure in which the trustee has the power and responsibility to initiate 
conclusion proceedings.391 
 
380 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 22(3) (Ger.). 
381 Id. § 19(2). 
382 Id. 
383 Id. § 18. 
384 Id. § 18(2).  The main reason to require a shareholder meeting is the European Union 
Council Directive 77/91, 1976 O.J. (L 26) 1 (EC) and various European Court of Justice 
cases, e.g., Case C-19/90 & C-20/90, Karella v. Minister for Indus., Energy, and Tech., 1991 
E.C.R. I-2691; Case C-381/89, Syndesmos v. The Greek State, 1992 E.C.R. I-2111; Case C-
441/93, Pafitis v. Trapeza Kentrikis Ellados AE, 1996 E.C.R. I-1347. 
385 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 18(3) (Ger.). 
386 Id. 
387 Id. § 19(4) (cramdown). 
388 Id. 
389 Id. § 22(1). 
390 U.S. Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (2006). 
391 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
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(b)  Regulatory intervention powers and procedures 
The amendments to the German Banking Act392 significantly increase 
the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority’s (BaFin) intervention 
powers.393  The Supervisory Authority will likely exercise primary 
oversight over the reorganization of systemically relevant banks by relying 
on the powers established in these amendments, including the involuntary 
petition for reorganization.  Furthermore, in context of these increased 
powers the likelihood that any systemically important bank may file a 
voluntary petition under the German stabilization or reorganization 
procedure seems remote at best.  This is confirmed by the fact that the 
German Banking Act, unlike the German Financial Institutions 
Reorganization Act, also applies to groups of financial institutions,394 
financial holdings,395 and conglomerates396 headquartered in Germany. 
 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 6(3) (Ger.). 
392 Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I 
at 2776. 
393 Dirk Auerbach & Kristen Donner, Änderungen bei den aufsichtlichen 
Eingriffinstrumenten des KWG durch das Restrukturierungsgesetz, DER BETRIEB, Jan. 4, 
2011, at 17. 
394 Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I 
at 2776, § 480 (“Measures relating to subordinated enterprises of groups of institutions”). 
395 Id. § 48p (“Measures at financial holding groups”). 
396 Id. § 48q (“Measures at financial conglomerates”). 
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The intervention powers of the Authority are very broad397 and include 
a variety of new reporting duties398 and supervisory powers.399  For 
example, the Authority may prohibit or limit withdrawals and distribution 
of profits,400 prohibit or limit balance sheet measures to offset net loss or 
show net profit,401 limit payments of returns on funds,402 order risk 
reduction as it relates to certain types of activities,403 prohibit or limit the 
payment of bonuses,404 and require a financial institution to draft a 
restructuring plan.405 
Under the new law the Authority may also transfer part or all of the 
systemically relevant assets from a distressed bank to a bridge bank.406  
 
397 Auerbach & Donner, supra note 393, at 17–18; Stengel, supra note 330, at 15; Höche, 
supra note 7, at 53. 
398 See, e.g., Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, 
BGBL. I at 2776, § 45(1), no. 1 (providing that BaFin may order the institution “to produce a 
substantiated description of the development of its key business activity over a period of at 
least three years, including projected balance sheets and projected profit and loss accounts, 
as well as of the development of its prudential ratios and to submit said description to BaFin 
and the Deutsche Bundesbank”). 
399 Id. § 45(1), nos. 2–4 (providing that BaFin may order the institution “to review 
measures for improving protection against or reducing the material risks identified by the 
institution and the associated risk concentrations and to report these to BaFin and the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, including consideration of strategies for exiting from individual 
business areas or severing the institution or group entities”). 
400 Id. § 45(2), no. 1 (providing that under certain circumstances, BaFin can “prohibit or 
limit withdrawals by the proprietors or partners and the distribution of profits”). 
401 Id. § 45(2), no. 2 (providing that under certain circumstances, BaFin can “prohibit or 
limit balance sheet measures that serve to offset a net loss or to show a net profit”). 
402 Id. § 45(2), no. 3 (providing that under certain circumstances, BaFin can “order that 
the payment of all types of returns on own funds instruments apart from those pursuant to 
section 10(5a) be fully or partly waived without replacement if they are not fully covered by 
a net profit for the year”). 
403 Id. § 45(2), no. 5 (providing that under certain circumstances, BaFin can “order the 
institution to take measures to reduce risks insofar as they arise from certain types of 
activities and products or through the use of certain systems”). 
404 Id. § 45(2), no. 6 (providing that under certain circumstances, BaFin can “prohibit the 
payment of variable remuneration components or limit such payment to a certain proportion 
of the net result for the year; this shall not apply to variable remuneration components 
specified in a collective agreement or, within its scope of application, in an agreement 
between the social partners applying the provisions of the collective agreement, or on the 
basis of a collective agreement, in a plant-level or service agreement”). 
405 Id. § 45(2), no. 7.  BaFin also has the power under KWG § 45c(1) to appoint a special 
administrator or trustee (“Sonderbeauftragter”) who may directly participate in the corporate 
governance of the failing bank and may even replace the CEO of the bank.  Id. § 45c(1).  
See, e.g., Auerbach & Donner, supra note 393, at 18–20. 
406 The concept of asset transfer is not new under German law and follows a similar 
concept established for insurance companies and mortgage lenders.  See Gesetz über die 
Beaufsichtigung der Versicherungsunternehmen [VAG] [Insurance Act], Dec. 17, 1992, 
BGBL I at 2, as amended Mar. 1, 2011, § 14 (Ger.); Pfandbriefgesetz [PfandBG] [German 
Mortgage Banking Law], May 22, 2005, BGBL. I at 1373, as amended, § 32 (Ger.).  Under 
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Toxic assets and additional liabilities may be left behind in the residual or 
bad bank, which will be liquidated.  A transfer order can only be executed if 
the financial “institution’s viability as a going concern is jeopardized 
(going-concern risk)”407 and the stability of the financial system is 
threatened.408  In addition, the order must be necessary.  The transfer cannot 
be ordered if the systemic risk could be avoided in an equally certain 
manner in any other way.409  The Authority has discretion to set a deadline 
before issuing any transfer order.410  If a deadline is set, the failing bank 
must present a viable recovery plan before the end of the deadline.  The 
plan must show that the bank is able to avert the going-concern risk within 
6 weeks after the deadline and prove that long-term viability is certain.  The 
plan must also include proof of adequate funding and sufficient liquidity.411  
Considering the turmoil of the financial crisis, it is doubtful that the 
Authority will ever have the privilege to exercise this discretion as time will 
be of the essence to prevent contagion.412 
A bridge bank is required to be a legal person413 headquartered in 
Germany414 and must fulfill the same legal requirements that apply to the 
organization of the distressed or transferring bank.415  The bridge bank may 
be any financial institution willing to participate in the rescue of the failing 
 
the VAG and the PfandBG a transfer requires a contractual agreement between transferee 
and transferor.  This is not required under the KWG 
407 Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL.I 
at 2776, § 48a(2), no. 1. 
408 Id. 
409 Id. § 48a(2), no. 2 (“the systemic risk arising from going concern risk cannot be 
eliminated in an equally certain manner in any other way than through the transfer order.”). 
410 Id. § 48c(1) (“If the risk situation persists, BaFin can, before issuing the transfer order, 
set the credit institution a time limit within which the credit institution must present a viable 
plan indicating in what way going-concern risk will be averted (recovery plan).”).  See also 
Manuel Lorenz, Der Regierungsentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Restrukturierung und geordneten 
Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten – Überblick und erste Einordnung, 13 Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG], 1046, 1051 (2010). 
411 Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL.I 
at 2776, § 48a(2), no. 2 (Ger.). 
412 See, Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 283. 
413 Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I 
at 2776, § 48c(5), no. 1 (“The transfer order shall not specify a legal entity as the transferee 
legal entity if (1) the legal entity is not constituted in the form of a legal person.”). 
414 Id. § 48c(5), no. 2 (“the legal entity has its head office outside Germany”).  It is highly 
questionable whether this requirement conforms to the Law of the European Union, namely 
the principal of free movement of capital, TFEU, art. 63. 
415 Id. (“If the credit institution is constituted in the legal form of a corporation, the 
transferee legal entity shall be constituted in the same legal form.”).  See also id. § 48g(6) 
(“Where the transferee legal entity does not have the authorisation required pursuant to 
section 32 to maintain the transferred operations as a going concern, the transfer order shall 
be deemed to be authorisation for the transferee legal entity with the same scope as the 
authorisation granted to the credit institution.”). 
Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring 
32:191 (2012) 
237 
bank or, in the alternative, the bridge bank may be specifically organized as 
a special purpose vehicle under government control.416  The bridge bank 
must consent to any transfer of assets and must give consideration to the 
distressed bank if the overall value of transferred assets is positive.417  
Generally, the consideration will include shares of the bridge bank, but may 
also consist of cash.418  However, because the required consideration must 
only be commensurate with the value of the transferred assets,419 there may 
often be significant disagreements over the issue of valuation.420  This is of 
particular significance if shares of the bridge bank are given as 
consideration requiring the need to evaluate the value of the bridge bank as 
well.421  The calculation of the value of the transferred assets may not, 
however, include support payments from public sources or include 
payments provided as part of any public bail-out.422  Conversely, if the 
value of the transferred assets is negative, the distressed or residual bank is 
required to compensate the bridge bank in cash.423 
  
 
416 Gesetz zur Einrichtung eines Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute [RStrukFG] 
[Law Establishing the Restructuring Fund for Financial Institutions], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I 
1900, 1921, as amended §§ 5–7 (Ger.); see also Karsten Müller-Eising et al., supra note 330, 
at 69. 
417 Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I 
at 2776, § 48d(1) (The transfer order shall provide for a consideration to the credit institution 
if the overall value of the assets to be transferred is positive.  The consideration shall consist 
of capital shares in the transferee legal entity.  If granting capital shares is unreasonable for 
the transferee legal entity or threatens to defeat the purpose of the transfer order, the 
consideration shall be determined in cash.). 
418 Id. 
419 Id. at § 48d(2). 
420 Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 284. 
421 Id.; see also Gregor Bachmann, Das neue Restrukturierungsrecht der Kreditinstitute, 
Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft [ZBB] 459, 467 (2010). 
422 Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I 
at 2776, § 48d(2) (At the time at which the transfer order is issued, the consideration must be 
commensurate with the value of the transferred assets.  Any support payments from the 
Restructuring Fund or government agencies that were provided or promised to avert or 
overcome the going-concern risk shall not be taken into consideration in the credit 
institution’s favor.  Central bank operations that are concluded on standard terms and 
conditions do not constitute support payments within the meaning of sentence 2.). 
423 Id. § 48d(6) (Where the aggregate value of the assets to be transferred is negative, the 
transfer order shall stipulate that the credit institution must compensate the transferee legal 
entity in cash (compensation liability).  The maturity and insolvency seniority of the 
compensation liability shall be based on the maturity and seniority of the liabilities included 
in the spin-off.  In the case of differing maturities or seniority levels, the relationship of the 
liabilities with different maturity or seniority levels to one another shall be the determining 
factor.  Subsections (2) to (4) shall apply mutatis mutandis.). 
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 After the transfer is complete and effective, the bridge bank is jointly 
and severally liable to all creditors;424 the liability includes both the 
transferred assets as well as those assets remaining with the distressed 
bank.425  Regardless, the liability of the bridge bank is limited to the amount 
of the claim a creditor would have received in a liquidation of the distressed 
bank prior to the transfer.426  Furthermore, the bridge bank is only liable to 
the extent that creditors cannot satisfy their claims through the distressed 
bank.427 
The effectiveness of the transfer may also trigger additional 
supervisory powers for the Supervisory Authority.  For example, the 
Authority may direct and instruct the distressed bank on how to exercise the 
voting rights on the shares received as consideration from the bridge 
 
424 Id. § 48h(1) (The credit institution shall be liable for the liabilities included in the 
spin-off only in the amount of the sum which the creditor would have received had the credit 
institution been wound up and no spin-off had taken place.  Liability shall exist only to the 
extent that the creditor cannot obtain satisfaction from the transferee legal entity.). 
425 Id. § 48k(3) (Notwithstanding § 48e(1), the transfer order may stipulate that only part 
of the assets, liabilities and legal relationships shall be transferred to the transferee legal 
entity (partial transfer).  In this case, notwithstanding § 48e(1) no. 2, the transfer order shall 
specify only those spin-off assets that are covered by the spin-off; alternatively, it may 
specify those spin-off assets that will remain with the institution.). 
426 Id. § 48h(1). 
427 Id. 
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bank.428  In addition, the bridge bank shares can only be sold or transferred 
after approval by the Authority,429 and the Authority has the power to 
monitor the viability of the transferred business assets.430 
(c)  The Law Establishing the Reorganization Fund for Financial 
Institutions 
The German Banking Reorganization Act of 2010 also established a 
reorganization fund (the fund) for financial institutions 
(Restrukturierungsfondsgesetz).431  The fund is a so-called Federal Special 
Fund established under Art. 110, section 1 of the German Constitution 
(Grundgesetz) and is part of the Federal Agency for Financial Market 
Stabilization (FMSA).432  The fund has no legal rights, but has the capacity 
to sue and be sued.433  The purpose of the fund is the stabilization of 
financial markets in Germany.434  As part of its powers, the fund is charged 
with establishing bridge banks and initiating public ownership in these 
bridge banks, if necessary.435  The fund also guarantees claims against any 
bridge bank436 and may provide funding for bridge banks.437  In order to 
avoid issues of moral hazard and public bail-out, financial institutions do 
not have a legal claim for support payment from the fund.  Rather, only 
bridge banks or private sector banks that aid in the recovery of a distressed 
bank may receive financial support from the fund.438 
The most controversial issues surrounding the establishment of the 
fund is the source of its funding and its size.  While the Federal Ministry of 
Justice can supplement the available funds with loan guarantees of up to 20 
 
428 Id. § 48l(2) (“BaFin can instruct the credit institution to exercise the voting rights to 
which it is entitled at the shareholders’ meeting of the transferee legal entity in a particular 
manner . . .”). 
429 Id. § 48l(3) (“[T]he credit institution may not, without prior written permission from 
BaFin, dispose of the capital shares in the transferee legal entity to which it is entitled.”). 
430 Id. § 48m(1) (“On request, the transferee legal entity shall promptly provide BaFin 
with information on all circumstances required to assess the viability of restructuring for the 
business units transferred to the transferee legal entity.”). 
431 Gesetz zur Einrichtung eines Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute [RStrukFG] 
[Law Establishing the Restructuring Fund for Financial Institutions], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I 
at 1900 (Ger.) [hereinafter [RStrukFG] [Restructuring Fund Law]]. 
432 Id. § 1.  See also Satzung der Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilisierung 
[FMSASatz] [Statute of the Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilization] Feb. 21, 
2011, BGBL. I at 272, §§ 1–3 (Ger.). 
433 [RStrukFG] [Restructuring Fund Law] § 9. 
434 Id. § 3(1). 
435 Id. § 5. 
436 Id. § 6. 
437 Id. § 7. 
438 Id. § 4.  See also Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 287. 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 32:191 (2012) 
240 
million euro,439 the reorganization fund is primarily financed by means of a 
bank levy on all German banks.440  The German government assessed the 
rates of these bank levies for the first time in July of 2011.441  The proposed 
levies are re-evaluated each year and rise in line with the business volume 
of each bank.442  Financial institutions with liabilities of up to 300 million 
euro do not contribute any funds.443  Banks with a business volume above 
300 million euros must contribute two basis points with a maximum of six 
will be levied on each bank.444  In addition, banks’ open futures rates will 
account for 0.03 basis points of the levy.445 
The German levy system is problematic because financial institutions 
without systemic relevance are required to contribute to the fund, yet are 
not able to receive fund support payments.446  The fact that all banks, 
regardless of systematic relevance, will at least indirectly benefit from 
stable financial markets by avoiding another crisis is the only possible 
argument in support of a general levy requirement.  The levy may also 
impact the competitiveness of German banks in more general terms, 
especially if German banks with subsidiaries or branches in other European 
countries are required to contribute to rescue funds in these other countries.  
As a result, a more harmonized, Union-wide solution could be preferable.  
Another point of contention is the size of the fund with a maximum volume 
of 70 billion euros.447  It is questionable if this amount will suffice during a 
financial crisis.  The availability of these funds and the time it will take to 
raise them is of even greater concern.448 
IV.  CONTINGENT CAPITAL IN BANK RESTRUCTURING 
Policy makers and legislative bodies in Europe and the United 
States449 are increasingly recognizing the possible use of contingent 
 
439 [RStrukFG] [Restructuring Fund Law], § 12(6). 
440 Id. § 2. 
441 Press Release, Federal Ministry of Justice, Cabinet Adopts Restructuring Fund 







446 See also Wolfgang Schön, Alexander Hellgardt, & Christine Osterloh-Konrad, 
Bankenabgabe und Verfassungsrecht – Teil I: Verfassungsrechtliche Zulässigkeit als 
Sonderabgabe,  WM - Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht, 2010, 2145 (Ger.). 
447 Gesetz zur Einrichtung eines Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute [RStrukFG] 
[Law Establishing the Restructuring Fund for Financial Institutions], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I 
at 1900, § 12(10) (Ger.). 
448 See, e.g., Stengel, supra note 330, at 16. 
449 Edmund L. Andrews, Bernanke, in Nod to Critics, Suggests Board of Regulators, 
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capital.450  One of the main benefits of contingent capital could be its role in 
helping to avoid insolvency and stabilizing financial markets. Although 
many academics support the use of contingent capital, disagreements on the 
design features451 and the mandatory or voluntary nature of contingent 
capital persist.452  Determining the optimal design features of contingent 
capital may require a concerted effort of policy-makers worldwide.  A 
common denominator on how to use contingent capital to avoid a future 
crisis could be, generally speaking, for a financial institution to issue a 
 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at B3 (quoting Bernanke stating, “that giant financial players 
might be forced to adopt contingent capital,” and noting that the contingent capital is 
“gaining popularity within the Fed.”); Daniel K. Tarullo, Federal Reserve Governor, Speech 
at the Exchequer Club in Washington, D.C. to the Federal Reserve: Confronting Too Big to 
Fail (Oct. 21, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
tarullo20091021a.htm (commenting that contingent capital is an effort “worth pursuing”).  In 
the E.U., see IP/11/915, supra note 8 (“The proposal will require banks to hold more and 
better capital to resist future shocks by themselves.”  The proposal also translates the bank 
capital agreed to in the Basel III agreement.). 
450 CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, at arts. 48–52. 
451 Coffee, supra note 26, at 806 (promoting contingent capital as an alternative to 
bankruptcy or bail-outs, Coffee suggests a contingent capital design where “(1) the 
conversion ratio would be deliberately designed to protect the debt holders from loss by 
instead diluting the existing equity holders; and (2) the debt security would convert into a 
fixed return preferred stock with cumulative arrearages and significant voting rights.”); 
FLANNERY, supra note 24; Robert L. McDonald, Contingent Capital with a Dual Price 
Trigger 20 (Northwestern University Kellogg Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper, Apr. 11, 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553430; George Pennacchi, A Structural Model 
of Contingent Bank Capital (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper 10-04, Apr. 
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1595080); George Pennacchi et al., Contingent 
Capital: The Case for COERCs 9, 13 (INSEAD Working Paper No. 2010/89/FIN, Oct. 27, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1656994; Squam 
Lake Working Group, supra note 24, at 4 (2009); Suresh Sundaresan & Zhenyu Wang, 
Design of Contingent Capital with a Stock Price Trigger for Mandatory Conversion  4 (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of N.Y., Working Paper, Apr. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/economists/wang/BankDebtTrigger.pdf (recognizing 
that a value transfer between equity and contingent capital “disturbs equilibrium by moving 
the stock price up or down, depending on the conversion ratio specified,” and that the 
proposals typically ensure that there is no value transfer at maturity, but do not ensure there 
is no transfer before maturity). 
452 Coffee, supra note 26, at 808 (“[W]ork even when regulatory oversight fails and a 
crisis sneaks in under the regulators’ radar screen.”); Letter Comment from Mary Frances 
Monroe, Vice President, Office of Regulatory Policy, American Bankers Association, to 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 3 (Oct. 1, 2010) (on file with Am. Bankers Ass’n) 
(Mandatory contingent capital would “hinder unduly the flexibility of banks to create a 
capital structure that best meets the needs of the bank and its investors  . . . .  Other banks 
may not be able to, or may find it inefficient to, issue contingent or convertible instruments 
for a variety of reasons – including, for instance, restrictions under their chartering 
instruments, tax issues related to the deductibility of payments on the instruments, lack of 
market access, or insufficient investor interest.  These banks should not be harmed by a 
perception that they are not as well capitalized as others simply because they need to or 
choose to meet their capital needs through other acceptable channels.”). 
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certain percentage of its long-term debt capital as convertible debt securities 
that convert into equity when triggered at the point of financial weakening 
of the financial institution.453 
Among the potential benefits of implementing contingent capital is the 
minimization of moral hazard, avoidance of financial contagion, and 
limitation of systemic risk by financial institutions that may be too big to 
fail.  Contingent capital is an automatic mechanism for increasing capital 
while reducing debt with the long-term benefit of lowering leverage.  
Contingent capital may also support general risk control in financial 
institutions454 and may contribute to minimizing moral hazard by holding 
shareholders responsible and internalizing bank failure costs.  Moreover, 
given the threat of loss due to conversion and the implicit dilution of stock 
holdings, contingent capital has the potential to reduce incentives for 
shareholders to encourage management to take higher risks for higher 
returns. 
Using contingent capital may also be less expensive and less time 
consuming than bankruptcy and could establish a preferable mix of 
incentives by creating ownership stakes in the holders of contingent capital.  
The holders of contingent capital may become actively involved in the 
reorganization of the financial institution after contingent capital has been 
converted.  Comparing contingent capital to equity, contingent capital could 
be cheaper, provided the interest expense is deemed tax deductible.  It 
would be a non-dilutive form of financing that would not bring the threat of 
change of control with it.  If deemed tax deductible, the tax advantages of 
contingent capital are likely the same as those in debt financing.  Tax 
authorities may also treat contingent capital as a hybrid. 
 
453 Coffee, supra note 26, at 795, 833; McDonald, supra note 451;FLANNERY, supra note 
24. 
454 Raghuram G. Rajan, Too Systemic to Fail: Consequences, Causes, and Potential 
Remedies 28 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, BIS Working Paper No. 305, Mar. 2010), available 
at http://www.bis.org/publ/work305.pdf (“[I]nstalling sprinklers . . . .  When the fire 
threatens, the sprinklers will turn on.”).  Contra Christian Koziol & Jochen Lawrenz, 
Contingent Convertibles: Solving or Seeding the Next Banking Crisis?, J. BANKING & FIN. 5, 
35 (2011) (Koziol and Lawrenz suggest that CoCo bonds may “create negative externalities, 
in the sense that the (destabilizing) risk-shifting problem induced by CoCo bonds may 
overcompensate the (stabilizing) effect of providing a pre-committed recapitalization to 
banks.”  Through the use of a “dynamic continuous-time framework,” the authors conclude 
that ”the beneficial impact of CoCo bonds crucially hinges on the assumption if bank 
managers have substantial discretion over the bank’s business risk.”  The authors contend 
that if complete contracts can be written, CoCos are clearly beneficial, however, if allowing 
for incomplete contracts, the authors argue that “CoCo bonds always distort risk taking 
incentives.  Therefore, equity holders have incentives to take excessive risks.  Thus, CoCos 
may be an example where individually rational decisions can have systemically undesirable 
outcomes.”). 
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A.  European Commission Proposal 
The European Commission has proposed a framework for prevention, 
crisis management and bank resolution.455  The Commission issued a 
working document for discussion and consultation purposes,456 which 
distinguishes between a comprehensive and targeted approach.457 The 
Commission also proposed the recognition of contingent capital as 
“Additional Tier 1 instruments.”458 
Analogous to the FSB459 and the Vickers Report,460 the European 
Commission proposed haircuts for all equity supplemented by a debt 
conversion of both subordinated and senior debt at a point when the 
financial institution is in danger of insolvency.  In other words, the 
Commission recognizes the benefits of contingent capital but only as a 
supplement to a system of regulatory write-down tools or bail-inables. The 
Commission presupposes a statutory power to write down subordinated 
debt and to convert subordinate debt into equity.461  It is in this latter 
context that the European Commission has proposed its comprehensive and 
targeted approach for supplementary debt write-down tools. 
Under the comprehensive approach, national resolution authorities 
could be given a statutory power to write down or convert to equity “all 
senior debt deemed necessary to ensure the credit institution is returned to 
solvency” upon the occurrence of a pre-defined trigger event.462  Under this 
proposal, national resolution authorities would also have the discretion to 
determine which classes of debt would be converted or written down and at 
what conversion rate.463  In addition, the size of the write down would 
depend on the financial situation of the institution, its assets and liabilities, 
 
455 The Internal Market and Services Directorate General (DG MARKT) is one of the 
directorates which make up the European Commission.  A main role of the DG Market is to 
coordinate the Commission’s policy on the European Single Market. Its primary function is 
to seek the removal of unjustified obstacles to trade and in the field of services and financial 
markets.  See, DG Internal Market and Services, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ 
internal_market/index_en.htm (April 14, 2012). 
456 DG Working Document, supra note 10. 
457 Id. 
458 CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10. 
459 FIN. STABILITY BD., REDUCING THE MORAL HAZARD POSED BY SYSTEMICALLY 
IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: FSB RECOMMENDATIONS AND TIME LINES 1 (Oct. 
2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101111a.pdf 
(noting that the risk associated with SIFIs includes moral hazard – their interconnectedness 
can cause “significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity.”). 
460 U.K. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT: CONSULTATION ON 
REFORM OPTIONS 180–81 (Apr. 2011), available at http://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/ 
htcdn/Interim-Report-110411.pdf. 
461 DG Working Paper, supra note 10, at 87. 
462 Id. 
463 Id. 
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and the amount of funds needed to restore viability and maintain market 
confidence.464  The Commission argues that the proper functioning of credit 
markets requires that short-term debt, as defined by a specified maximum 
maturity,465 swap repo and derivative counterparties, other trade creditors, 
as well as retail and wholesale deposits and secured debt should be 
excluded.466  In summary, the Commission considers the comprehensive 
approach adequate to “create maximum flexibility for the resolution 
authorities to return an institution to viability, install new management, and 
implement a recovery or restructuring plan to retain market confidence and 
access to funding.”467 
The alternative to the comprehensive approach is the targeted 
approach.468  Under the targeted approach national resolution authorities 
would require financial institutions to issue a fixed amount of debt that pre-
qualifies for write-down or conversion to equity on a pre-defined statutory 
trigger.469  The Commission suggests that the pre-qualified amount of debt 
could include a fixed minimum for all institutions between 4 and 19 per 
cent of risk-weighted assets.470  Although these numbers seem 
unrealistically high, the Commission seems to justify the proposal with an 
attempt to ensure that “debt contracts are not able [to] evolve in a way that 
would reduce the effectiveness of the regime and would provide certainty 
for both the institution and creditors about what would happen in a 
resolution.”471 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) will most likely play a 
dominant role in ensuring that similar and consistent treatment of 
prequalified debt is harmonized at the level of the European Union.  Some 
commentators have suggested that the market reaction to the European 
Commission proposal was negative.472  Uncertainties regarding knock-on-
effect and interaction with other proposals (including Basel III) are among 
 
464 Id. at 88. 
465 Contra Coffee, supra note 26, at 833 (arguing that the amount of contingent capital 
that should be triggered ought to be defined by short-term debt). 
466 DG Working Paper, supra note 10, at 88. 
467 Id. 
468 Id. at 89. 
469 Id.  (“[s]uch debt would need to include a contractual term which would specify that 
the relevant resolution authority could use a statutory power to write down the debt when the 
institution meets the trigger conditions for entry into resolution.”). 
470 Id. n. 24. 
471 Id. at 89. 
472 EUROPEAN BANKING FEDERATION (EBF), POSITIONING IN RESPECT OF THE EU 
COMMISSION CONSULTATION ON TECHNICAL DETAILS FOR A POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR 
BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION 1, 5, 53–61 (Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.ebf-
fbe.eu/uploads/documents/positions/BankingReg/3%20March%20201-EBF_Response_to_ 
COM_Crisis_Management_Consultation%20%28final%29.pdf. 
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the most serious open questions.473  Given the complexities that contingent 
capital presents from a regulatory and taxation standpoint, many open 
issues will have to be addressed.474 
The implementation of the debt write-down in the European 
Commission proposal also has the potential of increasing funding costs for 
financial institutions475 and could make funding more volatile.476  
Contingent capital securities could also promote greater concentration of 
larger banks with the associated anti-competitive results.477  On the other 
hand, the targeted approach could contractually set terms of conversion and 
timing that results in greater clarity and more accurate pricing.478 
 
473 PETER M. WERNER & EDWARD MURRAY, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASSOC. (ISDA), 
POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR BANK RECOVERY & RESOLUTION 1, 19–21(Mar. 3, 2011), 
available at http://www.isdadocs.org/speeches/pdf/EU_CrossBorderCrisisMgmt_ISDA 
Response_Mar11.pdf (ISDA responds to the EU’s “comprehensive EU framework for 
troubled and failing banks” and avers the following with regard to the debt write-down 
(“bail-in”) proposal: (1) international coordination for debt write-down is essential; (2) the 
proposal presents numerous complex issues such as interaction with other proposals 
(including Basel III), regulatory issues, and tax issues; (3) the legislative timetable is 
“unrealistic” and debt write-down should be tabled until some of these issues have been 
resolved because of the need for international coordination and the complex issues 
presented.  ISDA also contends that the debt write-down proposal would impact derivative 
transactions and argues that derivatives exposures “are not an appropriate form of debt to 
make subject to the write-down power.”  And lastly, ISDA emphasizes the importance of 
clarification and certainty with regard to the scope of the debt write-down regime.). 
474 Id. at 19–20. 
475 ASSOC. OF BRITISH INSURERS (ABI), THE ABI’S RESPONSE: DG INTERNAL MARKET 
SERVICES: TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR BANK RECOVERY AND 
RESOLUTION 1, 5–6 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.abi.org.uk/Media/Consultation_ 
Papers/Consultation_Responses.aspx [hereinafter ABI] (ABI notes that regardless of its 
members’ positive or negative views, the implementation of the debt write-down will 
increase banks’ funding costs.  Though the concept may provide greater certainty and 
discretion to regulators, it will result in greater uncertainty in the market.  Because this 
creates greater risk, it will increase costs, and this will “have the unintended effect of 
promoting greater concentration into larger banks.”  Ultimately, there is concern that the 
increased complexity will affect implementation and will not benefit an efficient funding 
sector.). 
476 DAVID HISCOCK, INT’L CAPITAL MKT. ASSOC. (ICMA), RESPONSE SUBMISSION RE: 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER – TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A POSSIBLE 
EUROPEAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 1, 2, 4 (Mar. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.icmagroup.org/ICMAGroup/files/c7/c7a2c1bd-f34c-4aaa-b75b-5ab648c 
16345.pdf (ICMA expresses concern that the bail-in regime will effectively increase rates for 
depositors by encumbering higher quality assets.  Banks will be confronted with increased 
competition for retail deposits, thus increasing the use of other forms of secured funding.  As 
a result of increased rates and competition, funding will become less stable.  ICMA notes 
that one positive aspect of the targeted approach is that investors may precisely express 
investment preferences.  This creates “a fairer transition to a new regime than simply 
imposing bail-in on existing investors.”). 
477 ABI, supra note 475, at 6. 
478 ASS’N. FOR FIN. MARKETS IN EUR. (AFME), RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
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Financial industry representatives on the national and international 
level have criticized the Commission proposal. Some suggest contractual 
arrangements for contingent capital should be triggered before a statutory 
bail-in is applied.479  Others oppose the proposed resolution tools involving 
full or partial write-downs on the basis that they could threaten covered 
bond markets.480  The key to the proposal seems to be the treatment of 
secured debt, derivatives, and covered bonds.481 
In the context of the comprehensive approach, some point to higher 
costs of senior debt instruments and their marketability and propose 
assurances that would guarantee that the priority claim of capital 
instruments remains intact when covering loss.482  In the context of the 
 
CONSULTATION ON TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR BANK 
RECOVERY & RESOLUTION 54–56 (2011), available at http://www.afme.eu/AFME/ 
What_We_Do/Final%20AFME%20Response.pdf (pointing out the two approaches to debt 
write-down proposed by the European Commission: (1) the “targeted” approach, which 
“would require banks to hold a fixed amount of ‘bail-in-able’ debt but that would exclude 
senior debt from the scope of any write-down;” and (2) the “comprehensive” approach, 
which would allow RAs to write-down senior debt.  AFME states its members primarily 
support the “ease and clarity of the targeted approach, in relation to the comprehensive 
approach, although neither option is completely without difficulties.”.  The targeted 
approach could contractually set terms of conversion and timing resulting in greater clarity 
and prices that are a more accurate reflection of risk.  AFME also recommends that the 
targeted approach be coordinated with Basel III, and ultimately, that the protection provided 
be studied.  AFME suggests that the comprehensive approach could be available to 
regulators as a “last resort” when the targeted approach proves inadequate.).  See also DG 
Working Document, supra note 10, at 89 (“Targeted approach: An alternative to a 
comprehensive approach would be for resolution authorities to require credit institutions to 
issue a fixed volume of ‘bail-in able’ debt which, in addition to the power to write off all 
equity, and either write off existing subordinated debt or convert it into an equity claim, 
could be written down or converted into equity on a statutory trigger.”). 
479 SWED. MINISTRY OF FIN ET AL., SWEDISH ANSWERS TO THE DG INTERNAL MARKET AND 
SERVICES WORKING DOCUMENT “TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR 
BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION” 44 (2011), available at http://www.riksbank.com 
/templates/YearList.aspx?id=20368&all=1 (Generally asserts that the untested bail-in regime 
should not be relied upon.  If the bail-in tool can be shown to be effective, it may be useful 
as a wind-down tool.  Specifically, it argues that the wind-down tools should include a 
statutory bail-in tool to “impose market discipline on unsecured debt holders as they can 
impose losses on those creditors.”  Further, it suggests that “[c]ontractual bail in instruments 
must trigger before a statutory bail in is applied.  Regulatory capital instruments must bear 
losses before any higher ranking debt.”  Such a scheme should still leave “the troubled banks 
well capitalized.”). 
480 REALKREDITRÅDET (ASS’N OF DANISH MORTG. BANKS), CONSULTATION RESPONSE 
CONCERNING TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR BANK RECOVERY AND 
RESOLUTION 2, 9 (Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://www.realkreditraadet.dk/Holdninger/ 
H%C3%B8ringssvar.aspx?M=News&PID=1755&NewsID=543. 
481 Id. 
482 EUROPEAN ASS’N OF PUBLIC BANKS (EAPB), COMMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN 
ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC BANKS ON THE TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK 
FOR BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION 8–9,  available at http://www.eapb.eu/file?fle=6701. 
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comprehensive approach, some point to higher costs of senior debt 
instruments and their marketability, and propose assurances that would 
guarantee that the rank of these capital instruments in bankruptcy remains 
intact and equal ("parri passu") to all other unsecured and unsubordinated 
debt.483 
B.  Basel Committee Proposal 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (The Basel Committee), 
suggested in an initial proposal that internationally active banks be required 
to have a clause in their debt instruments that, upon the occurrence of a 
triggering event, provides for a mandatory write-off or conversion to 
common stock.484  The proposal recommended ensuring the loss 
absorbency of regulatory capital at the point of non-viability.485  The 
proposal also required that such a clause could not conflict with the 
respective legal environment of each respective European Union Member 
State.486 
After the revision of the European regulatory structure, many 
commentators assumed the newly created European Banking Authority 
(EBA) would allow national regulators to use their existing Tier 1 
definitions.487  The European Commission, however, proposed a regulation 
on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms.488  
The proposal in effect harmonized the requirements for Tier I capital.489  
Almost simultaneously, the Basel Committee decided to use retained 
 
483 Id. 
484 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Proposal to Ensure the Loss Absorbency of 
Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non-Viability (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/ 
publ/bcbs174.pdf. 
485 Id. at 4–5 (“Proposed minimum requirement Scope and post trigger instrument 1.  All 
non-common Tier 1 instruments and Tier 2 instruments at internationally active banks must 
have a clause in their terms and conditions that requires them to be written-off on the 
occurrence of the trigger event. 2. Any compensation paid to the instrument holders as a 
result of the write-off must be paid immediately in the form of common stock (or its 
equivalent in the case of non- joint stock companies). 3. The issuing bank must maintain at 
all times all prior authorisation necessary to immediately issue the relevant number of shares 
specified in the instrument’s terms and conditions should the trigger event occur. 4. The 
trigger event is the earlier of: (1) the decision to make a public sector injection of capital, or 
equivalent support, without which the firm would have become non-viable, as determined by 
the relevant authority; and (2) a decision that a write-off, without which the firm would 
become non-viable, is necessary, as determined by the relevant authority. 5. The issuance of 
any new shares as a result of the trigger event must occur prior to any public sector injection 
of capital so that the capital provided by the public sector is not diluted.”). 
486 Id. at 3. 
487 David Enrich, Europe Blinks on Bank Test – Regulators Seen Easing ‘Stress’ Gauge, 
Undercutting Effort to Restore Confidence, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2011, at A1, A10. 
488 CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, arts. 48a, 49(1)(n), 51(b). 
489 Id. 
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earnings and ordinary shares rather than contingent capital to meet 
heightened capital requirements for SIFIs.490 Thereafter, the European 
Commission proposed harmonization in the context of Tier 1 capital, 
allowing convertible instrument capital as Tier 1 capital.491  The proposal 
would permit contingent capital securities as an “Additional Tier 1 
instrument.”492  This could be a first step toward a basic framework for 
harmonized contingent capital standards.  This framework could enable 
European Union Member States to provide national regulatory guidance on 
contingent capital or allow private ordering of contingent capital designs.493 
C.  Swiss Approach 
The Swiss approach to contingent capital distinguishes between high 
and low triggers for contingent capital securities (CCS) and allocates a 
maximum of 9 percent of the total core capital to CCS with predefined 
triggers.494  The Swiss Act on Banks and Savings Banks495 defines “criteria 
and determination of systemic importance”496 in Article 8 before defining 
“convertible capital” in Article 13.497 
The Swiss approach in Article 13 could perhaps become a model for 
other European legislators and perhaps even the U.S. legislator.  It gives the 
 
490 Louis Meera, Europeans Lose Out to U.S. with Basel Committee’s Contingent Capital 
Vote, BLOOMBERG, June 27, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-26/basel-
committee-decision-on-contingent-capital-backs-u-s-stance.html (noting that this was a 
victory for U.S. regulators over their European counterparts and quoting Karen Shaw Petrou, 
managing partner of Washington-based Federal Financial Analytics Inc., a bank consulting 
firm: “Europeans were pushing for a mix of common equity and contingent capital and they 
lost at a global level.”). 
491 CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, art. 49(1)(n) (the proposed regulation defines one 
form of “Additional Tier 1 instruments” as a capital instrument in which “the provisions 
governing the instruments require the principal amount of the instrument to be written down, 
or the instruments to be converted to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, upon the 
occurrence of a trigger event.”).  Additional Tier 1 capital is defined in the proposed 
regulation. See CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, art. 49(1)(n). 
492 CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, arts. 48a, 49(1)(n), 51(b). 
493 On the calibration of market mechanisms, private ordering, and mandatory rules see 
Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in 
Corporate Governance, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 101 (2012) [hereinafter 
Kaal Corporate Governance]; see also Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive 
Compensation (on file with author) [hereinafter Kaal Executive Compensation] (on the use 
of contingent capital for dynamic regulation of financial institutions). 
494 SWISS CONFEDERATION, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS FOR LIMITING 
THE ECONOMIC RISKS POSED BY LARGE COMPANIES 59–60 (2010), available at 
http://www.sif.admin.ch/dokumentation/00514/00519/00592/index.html?lang=en. 
495 BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN [BANKG] [FEDERAL LAW ON 
BANKS, SAVING AND LOANS] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952 (Switz.), available at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf (as of Mar. 1, 2012). 
496 Id. art. 8. 
497 Id. art. 13. 
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Board of Directors of systemically important banks498 the authority to issue 
“mandatory convertible bonds within the scope of the provisions of the 
articles of incorporation”499 but requires disclosure of the “conversion-
triggering event.”500  It also envisions the use of tranches and multiple 
trigger events.501 
The Swiss Banking Act requires that CCS are offered to shareholders 
and participation certificate holders in proportion to their then current 
holdings.502  If, however, the market environment requires it or if CCS are 
issued at a discount to facilitate a complete placement, a shareholders’ 
meeting may authorize the issuance of CCS to non-shareholders.503  If these 
requirements are fulfilled, the shareholders’ meeting of the respective SIFI 
would in effect allow the exclusion of “subscription rights of the 
shareholders and participation certificate holders.”504 
D.  The English Proposals 
In the United Kingdom, Lloyds Bank was the first bank to issue 
contingent capital securities in 2010.505  The issuance, through a non-U.S. 
bond-exchange offer, raised £8.5 billion of contingent core Tier 1 and core 
 
498 Id. art.7(2) (“The purpose of the provisions of this section, in concert with the 
generally applicable statutory banking regulations, is to reduce further the risks posed by 
systemically important banks to the stability of the Swiss financial system, to ensure the 
continuation of economically vital functions and to avoid government bail-out measures.”).  
Given the structure of the BankG, the use of contingent capital with sequential triggers 
seems to be possible in the Swiss model, although certain limitations in the Swiss model 
might require adjustments for contingent capital with sequential triggers.  See Wulf A. Kaal 
& Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers, 49 San Diego. L. Rev. 
221 (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter Kaal & Henkel Sequential]. 
499 Id. art. 13(3). 
500 Id. art. 13(5). 
501 Id. art. 13(3)(b) (“The trigger event or, in the case of tranches, the trigger events.”). 
502 BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN [BANKG] [FEDERAL LAW ON 
BANKS, SAVING AND LOANS] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952, art. 13(4) (Switz.), available at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf (as of Mar. 1, 2012). 
503 Id. 
504 Id.  English translation of an earlier version of the Swiss Banking Act at art. 12(2) (on 
file with authors) (“The Board of Directors can cancel the subscription rights of shareholders 
or participation certificate holders for good cause, particularly if this helps with the rapid and 
smooth placement of shares or participation certificates.”).  See also art. 13(1) (“The General 
Meeting can decide on a contingent increase in the share or participation capital by 
stipulating in the articles of incorporation that the debt securities arising from mandatory 
convertible bonds are converted into shares or participation certificates if the trigger event 
occurs.”).  See also FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS FOR LIMITING THE 
ECONOMIC RISKS POSED BY LARGE COMPANIES 67–68 (Sept. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.sif.admin.ch/dokumentation/00522/00715/index.html?lang=en&___= 
(“The Board of Directors can exclude or limit the former shareholders’ pre-emptive 
subscription rights for good cause.”). 
505 von Furstenberg, supra note 283, at 10. 
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Tier 1 notes.506  As a result of investor demand for the exchange offer 
exceeding $2.7 billion, which was almost three times the amount on offer, 
Lloyds issued the maximum of $986 million of enhanced capital notes.507  
The enhanced capital notes were designed to convert into equity in case 
Lloyds’ core Tier 1 capital ratio fell below 5 percent.508  Barclays, a bank 
based in the United Kingdom, has also contemplated the issuance of 
contingent capital securities to the public.509  Barclays has already issued 
contingent capital to its executives but with minimal governance 
improvements.510 
Other banks in the United Kingdom are considering the issuance of 
contingent capital if and when regulatory guidance is provided.511  While 
insolvency law in the United Kingdom already allows for so-called 
“Company Voluntary Arrangements,” an instrument comparable to 
traditional debt-equity swaps,512 the Bank of England did propose 
precautionary and non-viability contingent capital.513  Many open questions 
still need to be addressed in the context of contingent capital instruments.514 
E.  German Draft Amendments to the Corporation Act 
While German law does not provide per se for contingent capital 
securities, a debt-equity swap between creditors and financial institutions in 
reorganization is already an integral part of the German Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act.515  Unlike contingent capital securities, however, a 
debt-equity swap requires creditors’ consent under the German Law.516  The 
German Ministry of Justice seems to have recognized this as a shortcoming 
 
506 Kathy Sandler & Margot Patrick, Lloyds Raises $14 Billion in Bond Exchange, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 24, 2009, at C2. 
507 UPDATE 1-Lloyds gets Strong Demand for U.S. Bond Exchange, REUTERS, Dec. 8 
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/08/lloyds-idUSGEE5B70QB20091208. 
508 Id. 
509 Jenkins, supra note 282.  Another bank that has issued contingent capital is the Dutch 
Rabobank. 
510 See Kaal Executive Compensation, supra note 493. 
511 See Kaal Corporate Governance, supra note 493. 
512 See, e.g., Banking Act, 2009, c. 1, §§ 113, 154 (U.K.).  See also Insolvency Act, 1986, 
c. 45 (U.K.). 
513 BANK OF ENG., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 56 (2010), available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2010/fsrfull1012.pdf (suggesting that 
contingent capital will result in higher loss-absorbency and proposing two types of 
contingent capital: precautionary and non-viability). 
514 INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT: CONSULTATION ON REFORM 
OPTIONS 180–83 (2011) (U.K.), available at http://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/ 
htcdn/Interim-Report-110411.pdf (questioning who would buy contingent capital and the 
“possible dynamic effects” on banks “at or near to the trigger point”). 
515 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution 
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 9(1) (Ger.). 
516 Id. 
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and proposed amending the German Corporation Act.517  The proposed 
amendments seem to facilitate the implementation of contingent capital and 
would provide a statutory basis for the issuance of contingent capital 
securities in Germany.518  Implementing the amendments would require 
substantial changes in other areas of German law.519  This may not be easily 
achieved unless required under European Union law and internationally 
recognized.  The implementation of the amendments to the German 
Corporation Act could, to a large extent, also depend on the work of the 
Basel Committee and its use of contingent capital in Basel III.520 
V.  CONTINGENT CAPITAL DESIGN—TRIGGERING EVENT 
The efficient calibration of triggering events is central to the design of 
contingent capital.  The optimal design for a trigger event that converts debt 
into equity is unclear.521  Scholars discuss various trigger events that may 
 
517 Referentenentwurf des Bundesministeriums der Justiz, Gesetz zur Änderung des 
Aktiengesetzes, Nov. 11, 2010 (Ger.), available at http://www.der-betrieb.de/content/ 
pdfft,0,395158; see also Hans Diekmann, Andre Nolting, Aktienrechtsnovelle 2011, Neue 
Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 6, 8–9 (2011); Karsten Müller-Eising, 
Aktienrechtsnovelle 2011 – Änderungen zur Vorzugsaktie und zum bedingten Kapital für 
Wandelanleihen, Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsrecht (GWR) 591, 593 (2010); 
Handelsrechtsausschuss des Deutschen Anwaltsvereins Stellungnahme zum 
Referentenentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Aktiengesetzes (Aktienrechtsnovelle 
2011), Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 217, 220 (2011). 
518 The reform of the German Corporation Act is centered around Sections 192, 194, and 
221 AktG.  Under prior German Law, the instrument of “Mandatory Convertible Bonds” 
(“Pflichtwandelschuldverschreibung”) had already been recognized. 
519 Steffen Schneider & Markus Söhnchen, Rettung von Kreditinstituten in der Krise 
durch Contingent Convertible Bonds - Pflichtwandelschuldverschreibungen für Banken 
(“CoCo-Bonds”), FORUM-INSTITUT FÜR MANAGEMENT GMBH, available at 
http://www.forum-institut.de/fileadmin/data/Bereich_3/Rettung_von_Finanzinstituten_in_ 
der_Krise.pdf.  Id. (opining that the new Act would require a change of the 
Kreditwesengesetz [Banking Act], the Limited Act, the Corporation Act, the Insolvency Act, 
and the Schuldverschreibungsgesetzes.). 
520 Id.  See also discussion supra Part IV.B. on Basel Committees decision not to 
integrate contingent capital. 
521 Sundaresan & Wang, supra note 451 (recognizing that a value transfer between equity 
and contingent capital “disturbs equilibrium by moving the stock price up or down, 
depending on the conversion ratio specified,” and that the proposals typically ensure that 
there is no value transfer at maturity, but do not ensure there is no transfer before maturity.  
Because the value transfer will not always push the stock price across the trigger, there are 
two possible scenarios (equilibria): (1) “all investors believe conversion will not happen, 
leading stock price to stay above the trigger,” and (2) “all investors believe conversion will 
happen, leading stock price to hit the trigger.”  Sundaresan and Wang aver that “[s]ince two 
prices are possible whenever firm value drops to [a] certain level, by combining these dual 
equilibria around trigger at different times in the future, numerous expected equity values are 
possible even well before conversion.”).  See Coffee, supra note 562; FLANNERY, supra note 
24; McDonald, supra note 451; see also Darrell Duffie, Contractual Methods for Out-Of-
Court Restructuring of Systematically Important Financial Institutions 1, 4 (Nov. 9, 2009) 
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be categorized as follows: (1) transactional triggers, (2) automatic triggers, 
(3) statutory triggers, and (4) regulatory triggers.  Constituents favor trigger 
designs in accordance with their own utility preferences.  For instance, 
interest groups representing the banking industry seem to favor 
transactional triggers that are privately negotiated,522 subjective, and 
flexible.523  Some authors favor automatic triggers that convert debt into 
equity when a certain stock price, index value, CDS spread, capital ratio, or 
other trigger is reached.524  Others, including the Basel Committee, prefer 
statutory triggers that allow for regulatory discretion.525  Lastly, regulatory 
 
(Preliminary Draft: Submission Requested by the U.S. Treasury Working Group on Bank 
Capital), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/06Ending 
GovernmentBailoutsAsWeKnowThemDuffie.pdf (focusing on possible triggers of Distress - 
Contingent Convertible Bonds/Debt (essentially CCS).  If the trigger is an accounting capital 
ratio, it may not be able to capture the true financial condition of the bank because of 
accounting failures.  The ratio of tangible common equity (TCE) to tangible assets may be 
more effective because it excludes the “relatively useless assets during a solvency crisis.”  If 
the trigger is determined by market value, the impact of a short seller speculative attack 
could be mitigated by using a trailing average share price (e.g., the preceding 20 days).  To 
eliminate a “bank run,” the trigger should be set to convert debt into equity before a liquidity 
crisis begins. Duffie also discusses mandatory rights offerings.). 
522 Monroe, supra note 452, at 4 (“Contingent capital instruments should be based on 
terms and conditions, including triggering events, negotiated by banks and their investors. 
To do otherwise would be to require banks to issue securities for which no viable market 
exists at reasonable prices, thereby forcing banks to offer extraordinary return to compensate 
investors for extraordinary risk. This would cause a damaging hit to banks’ profitability and, 
therefore, to their ability to attract other forms of capital.”). 
523 Swedish Ministry of Finance, supra note 479, (favoring contractual trigger and 
arguing contractual trigger should come before statutory trigger); Monroe, supra note 452, at 
4–5 (favoring negotiated terms of contingent capital: “A regulatory trigger would be very 
subjective, allowing for a high degree of latitude by supervisory authorities without 
reference to specified criteria. Experience teaches that under political pressure regulators 
could be just as prone to forebear as they would be to exercise such a trigger. Regulatory 
triggers may also preclude the ability of a bank to “cure” a trigger event, a common feature 
of other capital instruments.”). 
524 Coffee, supra note 26, at 831; Flannery, supra note 24, at 11–12; Mark J. Flannery, 
No Pain, No Gain? Effecting Market Discipline via “Reverse Convertible Debentures” 30 
(Nov. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/f 
lannery/No%20Pain,%20No%20Gain.pdf [hereinafter Flannery No Pain] (“Frequent trigger 
evaluations eliminate moral hazard incentives and expose the RCD to surprisingly low 
default risk.”); McDonald, supra note 451, at 2 (proposing “a form of contingent capital for 
financial institutions that converts from debt to equity if two conditions are met: the firm’s 
stock price is at or below a trigger value and the value of a financial institutions index is also 
at or below a trigger value.”); Paul Glasserman & Behzad Nouri, Contingent Capital with a 
Capital-Ratio Trigger (Aug. 31, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669686 
(analyzing the case of contingent capital with a capital-ratio trigger and partial and on-going 
conversion). 
525  See, GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL MKTS. INST., CONTINGENT CAPITAL: POSSIBILITIES, 
PROMISES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 4 (2011), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-
thinking/global-economic-outlook/global-econ-outlook-pdfs/contigent-capital.pdf 
[hereinafter Goldman Sachs].  See also SWEDISH MINISTRY OF FINANCE, THE RIKSBANK, THE 
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triggers converting debt into equity can be precipitated by, for instance, the 
results of a bank stress test.  This might occur when a financial institution 
decides to write off a portion of its assets or when a regulator determines 
that a financial institution is not financially viable without a public sector 
injection of equity capital.526  Some authors suggest several and often 
interrelated triggering events.527 Contingent capital with sequential triggers 
can combine elements from various trigger designs.528 
A.  Trigger Events – Uncertainty – Market Development 
Given the range of public sector injections into struggling financial 
institutions during the financial crisis, the European Commission suggests 
that a mandatory minimum issuance of contingent capital could range from 
4 to 19 percent of risk-weighted assets.529  Others believe the range of 
mandatory contingent capital issuance should approach between 4 and 8 
percent of risk-weighted assets.530  Mandatory issuance of contingent 
capital does not guarantee that a viable market in contingent capital 
securities will develop. The nascent market in European contingent capital 
securities developed through the involvement of hedge funds and other 
private market participants.531  The expansion of an international market in 
contingent capital securities will depend on many factors, including perhaps 
 
SWEDISH FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY & THE SWEDISH NATIONAL DEBT OFFICE, 
SWEDISH ANSWERS TO THE DG INTERNAL MARKET AND SERVICES WORKING DOCUMENT 
“TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR BANK RECOVERY AND 
RESOLUTION” 1, 43 (March 3, 2011), available at http://www.riksbank.com/templates/ 
YearList.aspx?id=20368&all=1 (arguing that the wind-down tools should include a statutory 
bail-in tool.);  Ceyla Pazarbasioglu et al., Contingent Capital: Economic Rationale and 
Design Features, IMF Staff Discussion Note 18 (January 25, 2011), available at 
 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn 1101.pdf   (advocating a statutory bail-in 
regime as opposed to contingent capital); FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, KEY ATTRIBUTES OF 
EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION REGIMES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1, 9-10 (OCTOBER 2011), 
available at http://www.financial stabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104cc.pdf  (among 
other suggestions, arguing in favor of “apply[ing] one or a combination of resolution powers, 
with resolution actions being either combined or applied sequentially.”). 
526 FLANNERY, supra note 24 (recommending that conversion of debt security be tied to a 
decline in the bank’s equity ratio); BIS III, supra note 48, at 7. 
527 FLANNERY, supra note 24; Flannery No Pain, supra note 524; McDonald, supra note 
451, at 2 (proposing “a form of contingent capital for financial institutions that converts from 
debt to equity if two conditions are met: the firm’s stock price is at or below a trigger value 
and the value of a financial institutions index is also at or below a trigger value.”); 
Glasserman & Nouri, supra note 524 (analyzing the case of contingent capital with a capital-
ratio trigger and partial and on-going conversion). 
528 Kaal & Henkel Sequential, supra note 498. 
529 DG Working Document, supra note 10, Annex, n. 24. 
530 Goldman Sachs, supra note 525. 
531 See Kaal Corporate Governance, supra note 493. 
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a level of convergence in CCS designs and issuance volumes.532  
Developing a critical mass for the market in contingent capital securities 
could require banks and other financial institutions to purchase their 
competitors’ contingent capital securities.533  That could raise ethical, 
antitrust, and incentive concerns.534 
The interplay between the structuring of trigger events, the resulting 
level of uncertainty for market participants, and the development of a 
market in CCS has not been systematically studied.  Graph 1 shows a 
possible inverse relationship between the volume of CCS issuance and risk 
or a higher interest rate as a proxy for risk taking.  Line 1 shows that, as the 
uncertainty generated by the trigger designs increases, the volume of CCS 
could decrease.  Line 2 suggests that risk and the interest rates of CCS 
(before conversion) will increase with the level of uncertainty in the trigger 
design promulgated by policy makers and legislators. 
A large variety of trigger designs and a combination of trigger designs 
is possible.  Graph 1 categorizes trigger designs into institution specific and 
systemic.  Institution specific triggers may be transactional or automatic.  
Systemic triggers can be statutory or regulatory.  A regulatory systemic 
trigger may generate the highest degree of uncertainty, as suggested in 
 
532 Goldman Sachs, supra note 525. 
533 See Kaal Corporate Governance, supra note 493. 
534 Id. 
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Graph 1.  This can be a trigger that converts CCS into equity upon, for 
instance, a regulator’s decision that additional capital is needed.535  
Regulatory triggers can also be based on stress tests, or the determination 
that the respective bank is not viable without a public sector injection of 
capital or a write-off.536  A statutory systemic trigger is a trigger that by law 
converts CCS to equity when, for instance, a legally defined mortgage 
delinquency rate is reached.  This would not provide regulators with 
discretion.  Instead, statutory systemic triggers may be based on somewhat 
more objective measures, such as a delinquency rate, defined by law. The 
lack of regulatory discretion in the statutory systemic trigger would 
presumably give market participants more certainty as to possible trigger 
scenarios than a regulatory systemic trigger. 
In this model, institution specific triggers would grant the most 
certainty to market participants.  An automatic institution-specific trigger 
could be based on reaching a certain predefined threshold in the share price, 
credit default swap spreads, or debt equity ratios.537  Assuming that SIFIs 
would be required to disclose all CCS contracts with counterparties, 
including any triggering events therein, transactional institution-specific 
triggers may involve the lowest level of uncertainty for market participants. 
B.  Timing Trigger Events 
The timing of triggering events is a crucial element in the design of 
contingent capital securities.  If conversion is triggered too early without a 
real need for an equity capital injection (and additional voting 
shareholders), the impact of the equity capital injection may have dissipated 
and may no longer be available when actually needed.  If conversion from 
debt to equity is triggered too late, the financial institution may already be 
in the resolution stage and conversion at that stage would not supply the 
company with sufficient equity to turn the company around.  It is also 
unclear if contingent capital securities should be converted incrementally to 
soften the negative effect an early or late conversion may have.  Jack Coffee 
prefers an incremental conversion in a series of steps.538  Others argue 
 
535 See, e.g., Flannery No Pain, supra note 524, at 182–87 (supporting conversion of debt 
security tied to decline in bank’s equity ratio).  Contra McDonald, supra note 451, at 3 
(rejecting the use of accounting figures in the trigger or conversion formulas); Coffee, supra 
note 26, at 831 (arguing against the use of account numbers in triggers). 
536 BIS III, supra note 48. 
537 Some have argued that these market based triggers could be subject to manipulation, 
see Ceyla Pazarbasioglu et al., Contingent Capital: Economic Rationale and Design 
Features, IMF Staff Staff Discussion Note (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.imf.org 
/external/ pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1101.pdf. 
538 Coffee, supra note 26, at 830 (arguing for incremental conversion in a series of steps 
because that incremental conversion enables an early trigger for conversion.  He uses the 
following example: “[A]n incremental design might hypothetically convert 25% of the 
convertible bonds on a 25% stock price decline from the stock price on the date of the 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 32:191 (2012) 
256 
contingent capital provisions should permit “carefully designed partial or 
temporary write-downs within reasonable bounds.”539 
C.  Dual Triggers in Going and Gone Concern 
Scholars have previously proposed models for contingent capital that 
involve dual triggers.  McDonald suggests a model for contingent capital 
where debt converts to equity if both (1) “the firm’s stock price is at or 
below a trigger value,” and (2) “the value of a financial institution’s index is 
also at or below a trigger value.”540  McDonald provides an example of 
contingent capital with dual triggers and compares this model with other 
alternatives.  McDonald also discusses various issues related to evaluating 
contingent capital proposals including the effect of market manipulation, 
capital errors,541 and problems with reliance on accounting measures.  A 
central strength of the dual trigger proposals is their reliance on market 
prices.  A major disadvantage is the index trigger, which could potentially 
create incentives to manipulate the index or to try to force an entity into 
bankruptcy.542  However, McDonald’s dual-price trigger may act like a 
single-price trigger in times of stress.  Outside of a crisis scenario, the dual-
price trigger contingent capital acts more like standard subordinated debt.543 
Sequential triggers, on the other hand, may allow the conversion of 
 
bonds’ issuance; another 25% might convert on a further 25% decline; and the balance 
would convert if the stock price fell 75% (or more) from the original price.”). 
539 Monroe, supra note 452, at 4. 
540 McDonald, supra note 451, Abstract. 
541 Such as contingent capital converting into equity when not required and contingent 
capital failing to convert into equity when it is required. 
542 McDonald, supra note 451, at 13 (“The difference between the converted and 
unconverted bond is greatest when the bond is close to maturity and the payment of par is a 
few days away. This is clearly a case where traders might try to manipulate the index to 
avoid conversion [. . . .] Under some circumstances bondholders could have an incentive to 
try to force the institution into bankruptcy before conversion can occur. Suppose the share 
price is very low but the index price is above the trigger. Bond-holders may believe that they 
will receive a greater percentage of principal as subordinated bondholders in bankruptcy as 
opposed to the value of shares they would receive in default.”).  See also Mark J. Flannery, 
Stabilizing Large Financial Institutions with Contingent Capital Certificates 18-19 (2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1485689 (“A market-valued 
trigger might attract market manipulation. A speculator could purchase some CCC, short the 
stock, and receive under-valued shares when the conversion trigger was tripped. If short 
sales could force a solvent firm’s share price to zero, CCC might destabilize financial firms 
rather than stabilizing them.”). 
543 George Pennacchi, A Structural Model of Contingent Bank Capital, supra note 451, at 
12 (arguing that “dual-price trigger contingent capital acts like single-price trigger 
contingent capital in a crisis but acts like standard subordinated debt in a non-crisis.”).  See 
also George Pennacchi, A Structural Model of Contingent Bank Capital, supra note451, at 
28 (concluding that “yields on dual-price trigger contingent capital fall between those of 
comparable single-price trigger contingent capital and subordinated debt”). 
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contingent capital into equity in a going and gone concern scenario.544  
Given that the European Commission structures its resolution regime into 
going and gone concern with a significant role for contingent capital in both 
going and gone concern,545 sequential triggers in going and gone concern 
could help improve incentives for decision makers in the financial 
institutions and policy makers.546  Sequential triggers within the European 
Commission’s targeted and comprehensive approach547 could take various 
forms.  The first trigger converting contingent capital securities into equity 
could be based on various models that had previously been discussed in the 
literature.548 
If the financial health of the financial institution does not return up to a 
predefined threshold, the voting rights of such common stock (as a result of 
conversion from debt into equity) could be changed to give the former 
holder of contingent capital securities more influence in the resolution 
phase of the financial institution.549  This has several benefits.  Given the 
risk that policy makers may not structure the trigger appropriately, the 
negative effects of inadequate or untimely conversion of debt into equity at 
a time when the company requires a capital injection could be cushioned 
with a second trigger before the reorganization or resolution of the 
company.550  A second trigger pre-reorganization of the entity could add an 
element of prudential regulation because it would apply only to a small 
portion of SIFIs rather than all internationally active banks.  It would only 
come into effect if the first trigger was unsuccessful, and it would merely 
increase the dilution of shareholder voting rights as a remedy of last resort 
before bankruptcy.551  The interplay of conversion from debt to equity 
before resolution as a preventative act and the use of a second trigger in the 
resolution stage would have to be carefully calibrated.  More research is 
needed to determine the best incentive structure for contingent capital 
holders and management.552 
 
544 Kaal & Henkel Sequential, supra note 498. 
545 DG Working Document, supra note 10, at Annex I. 
546 See Kaal & Henkel Sequential, supra note 498 (proposing sequential triggers where 
the first trigger would be a preventative tool while the second trigger before the resolution 
phase would provide additional voting rights for contingent capital holders to secure success 
of the first trigger and set appropriate incentives for shareholder and management). 
547 Id. 
548 See generally Coffee, supra note 26. 
549 Kaal & Henkel Sequential, supra note 498. 
550 Id. 
551 Id. 
552 See further Kaal Executive Compensation, supra note 493. 
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VI.  CONTINGENT CAPITAL AS A PREVENTATIVE TOOL IN 
EUROPEAN UNION BANK RESTRUCTURING 
Proposals on bank restructuring by the European Commission,553 the 
Basel Committee,554 and the Financial Stability Board555 focus on statutory 
debt write-down or bail-inables within resolution.  Although the potential of 
contingent capital as a preventative tool is widely recognized,556 the 
European Commission and national legislators have not yet adopted 
contingent capital as a mandatory part of capital requirements for financial 
institutions.  Instead the European Commission merely favors the 
recognition of contingent capital as Tier 1 common equity, leaving the 
implementation of contingent capital to the markets and the discretion of 
national legislators.557 
For instance, the Swiss approach to contingent capital stops short of 
making the issuance of contingent capital a mandatory requirement for 
Swiss SIFIs.  The Swiss Banking Act requires Swiss SIFIs to be prepared 
for future crises558 but leaves it up to management to determine if such 
preparation should entail the issuance of contingent capital or raising 
additional capital.559  In practice, however, issuing contingent capital 
securities could be less expensive than raising additional Tier 1 capital. 
With total Swiss capital requirements at 19 % of risk weighted assets, well 
beyond the capital requirements under Basel III, Swiss SIFIs could be well 
advised to issue contingent capital securities.  The Swiss Banking Act 
requires a regular review of its provisions to ensure comparability with 
international standards.560 
At the European level, the European Union bank resolution regime 
could be further enhanced with contingent capital. The European bank 
resolution regime could work more effectively and more comprehensively 
 
553 See DG Working Document, supra note 10. 
554 See Bank for Int’l Settlements [BIS], Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, 
Consultative Document: Global Systemically Important Banks: Assessment Methodology 
and the Additional Loss Absorbency Requirement (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/ 
publ/bcbs201.pdf. 
555 See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 71. 
556 See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 27; see also DG Working Document, supra note 
10; see CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10; see CRD IV Directive, supra note 10. 
557 See. e.g., CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, arts. 48a, 49(1)(n), & 51(b). 
558 BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN [BANKG] [FEDERAL LAW ON 
BANKS, SAVING AND LOANS] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952, art. 9 (Switz.), available at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2011/7487.pdf. 
559 See Swiss Banking Act, SR 952.0 art. 11, 14 
560 The Swiss Banking Act specifically requires a regular review of all provisions after 
the implementation of the initial amendments.  The first review is scheduled, at the latest, 
three years after the implementation, and followed by a two-year interval thereafter.  The 
goal of the review is a comparison with international standards in other countries.  See id. 
art. 52. 
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with contingent capital as a preventative tool.  Contingent capital could play 
an important role in an effective resolution regime, it could provide 
additional loss absorbing capital before any regulatory intervention is 
necessary, and contingent capital could be a reliable source of common 
equity.561  This is of particular significance if SIFIs are mandated to 
organize in a manner that ensures the continuous operation of their 
systemically important sectors.562 
Contingent capital could work well within the European Commission 
proposal on bank resolution.  It could be part of bank capital requirements.  
Alternatively, contingent capital could become part of resolution and 
recovery plans prior to financial institutions entering the vicinity of 
bankruptcy.  The issuance of contingent capital could take place at the 
earliest possible stage, when the institution is still sound on a micro-
prudential basis.563  It could also be part of mandated recapitalizations if 
financial institutions are unable to pass stress tests.564  Conversion of CCS 
from debt to equity should take place when problems are first detected but 
before early intervention powers of regulatory authorities are triggered.565 
Contingent capital may help SIFIs to reorganize without the 
involvement of courts and regulators.  Compared to preferred stock, Tier 2 
debt, and other subordinated debt, contingent capital can help firms to 
recover from distress without going into resolution.566  It could provide a 
soft-landing similar to reorganization as a going concern through the debtor 
in possession under Chapter 11.567  The restructuring of a financial 
 
561 Kaal & Henkel Sequential, supra note 546. 
562 See, e.g., BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN [BANKG] [FEDERAL 
LAW ON BANKS, SAVING AND LOANS] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952, art. 9, ¶ 2(a)(2) (Switz.) (“2. 
Systemically important banks must specifically: (a) dispose of common equity, which will 
namely: . . . 2. Contribute substantially to the continuing operation of all systemically 
relevant functions in case of impending insolvency.”); id. art. 9, ¶ 2(d) (“2. Systemically 
important banks must specifically: . . . (d) provide for a resolution plan that can be 
implemented immediately and in case of impending insolvency ensures the continuing 
operation of all systemically relevant functions.  The resolution plan must address structural, 
infrastructural, management and control concerns, and shall ensure group internal capital 
flow and liquidity.”); id. at art. 10, ¶ 10(2) (“2. The systemically important bank shall prove 
that it fulfills the specific requirements of art. 2, subsection 2(d) and is able to continue the 
operation of its systemically important functions in case of impending insolvency.  If the 
bank cannot provide this proof, FINMA shall order the implementation of all appropriate 
measures.”) (translations provided by the authors). 
563 John C. Coffee, supra note 26, at 831 (providing a rationale for why an “early and 
incremental conversion” may be advantageous). 
564 See, e.g., Brooke Masters, Peggy Hollinger & Alex Barker, EU to Speed 
Recapitalization of Smaller Banks, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/ 
s/0/49d6240e-e527-11e0-bdb8-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1bBppLalv. 
565 Specific trigger designs may require additional research, Member State consensus, 
and market development.  See discussion supra Part V. 
566 FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 75, at 12; see supra text accompanying note 555. 
567 Kaal & Henkel Sequential, supra note 546 (elaborating on the use of contingent 
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institution would be initiated on a voluntary basis by the institution itself 
and without any public involvement.  Contingent capital would provide 
additional downside protection. 
Contingent capital as a preventative tool would not impede the 
statutory core power or debt write-down tool of bail-inables within 
resolution.  If the contractual debt write-down and conversion at an early 
stage does not achieve the desired result, regulatory authorities would not 
be prevented from intervening and initiating a write-down or haircut aimed 
at all shareholders, debt investors, and other private parties involved. 
VII.  CONVERGENCE 
Without a degree of similarity and convergence in bank resolution and 
contingent capital rules, regulatory arbitrage could have an adverse effect 
on establishing contingent capital as an integral part of financial markets.  
Although many proposals on contingent capital are based on similar ideas, a 
coherent trend toward convergence of contingent capital standards seems 
still elusive.  This could partially be due to a first mover problem. Single 
jurisdictions could be hesitant to implement contingent capital requirements 
without first knowing how other jurisdictions and financial institutions that 
compete with their home institutions may structure their contingent capital 
rules. 
The European Commission Regulation Proposal which defines Tier 1 
capital568 could be a first step toward setting up a basic framework for 
harmonized contingent capital standards.  While the Commission proposal 
only harmonizes the definition of Tier 1 capital, Member States are free to 
set up rules for contingent capital or leave contingent capital designs up to 
private ordering.569  The European Commission Regulation Proposal and its 
harmonization of the Tier I capital definition could fill a void left by the 
Basel Committee.  The Basel Committee rejected requests from EU 
Member States to use contingent capital to satisfy the new capital buffer 
requirements under Basel III.570  Instead, the Basel Committee decided to 
require SIFIs to use retained earnings and ordinary shares to meet 
heightened capital requirements.571  While this approach will not fully 
 
capital as a pre-reorganization tool). 
568 CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10. 
569 For a discussion on the benefits of private ordering and the calibration of market 
mechanisms, private ordering, and mandatory rules see Kaal, Corporate Governance, supra 
note 493; see also Kaal, Executive Compensation, supra note 493 (discussing the use of 
contingent capital for dynamic regulation of financial institutions). 
570 Meera, supra note 490. 
571 Id. (noting that this was a victory for U.S. regulators over their European counterparts 
and quoting Karen Shaw Petrou, managing partner of Federal Financial Analytics Inc., a 
Washington-based, bank consulting firm: “Europeans were pushing for a mix of common 
equity and contingent capital and they lost at a global level.”). 
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replace a requirement under Basel III to use contingent capital to satisfy a 
new capital buffer, it leaves enough flexibility for counterparties and the 
legislators in the respective EU Member States to implement contingent 
capital. 
Despite an active discourse on harmonization and convergence of 
contingent capital criteria in Europe, the debate in the United States on the 
use of contingent capital in bank restructuring is just in the beginning 
stages.572  Although the Dodd Frank Act authorizes the use of contingent 
capital, its design features and the extent of its potential applications are 
unclear.573  The Federal Reserve Board, through Section 165(b)(1)(B) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, can impose “a contingent capital requirement” on both 
“nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors” and 
certain “bank holding companies.”574  However, this authority is contingent 
on the outcome of a study on the feasibility of contingent capital.575  The 
SEC study, mandated by Section 115 (c) of the Dodd-Frank Act, requires 
an evaluation of the international competitiveness of United States 
companies that implement contingent capital.576 
Single jurisdictions may be deterred from implementing contingent 
capital requirements without knowing or being able to anticipate how other 
jurisdictions will structure their contingent capital rules. This could be a 
special concern because legislators may want to structure contingent capital 
rules in a way that enables their national financial institutions to compete 
with other international financial institutions that would be subject to the 
 
572 Coffee, supra note 26, at 846. 
573 Kaal & Henkel Sequential, supra note 498. 
574 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
575 Id. § 165(c)(1) (“CONTINGENT CAPITAL.— (1) IN GENERAL.— Subsequent to 
submission by the Council of a report to Congress under section 115(c), the Board of 
Governors may issue regulations that require each nonbank financial company supervised by 
the Board of Governors and bank holding companies described in subsection . . .”).  The 
content of the study is described in Section 115 (c) of the Dodd-Frank Act. (“(c) 
CONTINGENT CAPITAL.— (1) STUDY REQUIRED.—The Council shall conduct a 
study of the feasibility, benefits, costs, and structure of a contingent capital requirement for 
nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors and bank holding 
companies described in subsection (a), which study shall include— (A) an evaluation of the 
degree to which such requirement would enhance the safety and soundness of companies 
subject to the requirement, promote the financial stability of the United States, and reduce 
risks to United States tax- payers; (B) an evaluation of the characteristics and amounts of 
contingent capital that should be required; (C) an analysis of potential prudential standards 
that should be used to determine whether the contingent capital of a company would be 
converted to equity in times of financial stress; (D) an evaluation of the costs to companies, 
the effects on the structure and operation of credit and other financial markets, and other 
economic effects of requiring contingent capital; (E) an evaluation of the effects of such 
requirement on the international competitiveness of companies subject to the requirement 
and the prospects for international coordination in establishing such requirement; and (F) 
recommendations for implementing regulations.”). 
576 Id. § 115 (c)(1)(D)–(E). 
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contingent capital rules in their home state.  Without a certain level of 
convergence in contingent capital rules, regulatory arbitrage could have an 
adverse effect on establishing contingent capital as an integral part of 
financial markets. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Disparate bank resolution and restructuring regimes in Europe and the 
United States could face many challenges in future crises.  Contingent 
capital may offer a viable and efficient alternative for the prevention of 
bank failure and facilitates the efficient restructuring and resolution of 
failing financial institutions.  Similar to a Chapter 11 reorganization 
procedure, contingent capital could offer a soft landing for banks in distress 
and may be specifically well suited for systemically important financial 
institutions.  The European Commission has recognized the possible role 
contingent capital could play for the European banking sector.  Contingent 
capital may also enhance and harmonize disparate resolution regimes 
throughout the European Union and could help ensure the competitiveness 
of the financial sector.  The exact calibration of design features is crucial for 
the establishment of a future market in contingent capital securities.  The 
uncertainties involved in the trigger mechanisms may require a reevaluation 
of trigger designs currently under consideration.  Given the European 
initiatives on contingent capital and the nascent market in European 
contingent capital securities, the Board of Governors of the United States 
Federal Reserve would be well advised to consider implementing 
contingent capital standards.  Contingent capital securities could help 
ensure the future competitiveness of financial institutions in the United 
States. 
